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ABSTRACT 
 
An extensive literature examines the modern era (1976-present day) of American capital 
punishment. Some has focused on why the institution persists despite abolition from 
the rest of the Western world. An example of this is Steiker and Steiker (2016) who 
argue that judicial rationalization of capital law has helped to legitimate and thus sustain 
the modern death penalty. However, no work attempts to understand capital 
punishment or its persistence in America in regards to neoliberalism. To address this 
void in understanding, I conceptualize Ritzer’s four tenets of McDonaldization 
(predictability, calculability, efficiency, control) as a representation of market rationality, 
which neoliberalism seeks to insert into various societal spheres (including penality). I 
examine modern era developments in capital punishment in the United States through 
the contextual framework of McDonaldization to understand how McDonaldization has 
served to legitimate the institution.  My analysis suggests a transition of the 
neoliberalized death penalty in the direction of government of government, or what 
Dean (2010), drawing on Foucault’s treatment of governmentality, calls reflexive 
government.     
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
There has been a wealth of literature written about American capital 
punishment. Much of the work, such as that of Banner (2003) or Paternoster et al. 
(2007), has focused on the history of the institution. Some more recent work by Steiker 
and Steiker (2014, 2016) has focused on the rationalization of the death penalty, and 
the legitimating effects that come from it. Despite all that has been written, no one has 
applied Ritzer’s (2013) concept of McDonaldization, or more broadly neoliberal theory, 
as a contextual theoretical framework for understanding modern capital punishment in 
the United States. Ritzer (2013) defines McDonaldization as “the process by which the 
principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of 
American society as well as the rest of the world” (p. 1). Briefly, neoliberalism is, as the 
name suggests, the “new” form of liberalism which can broadly be said to privilege the 
free market and individual freedom over everything else. Of course, as I say this is a 
broad definition, as there are many variations within neoliberalism, and contradictions 
in theory and practice (Harvey, 2005). The part of neoliberalism that I am most 
concerned with, and will discuss at greater length later, is its tendency to insert market 
rationality into numerous spheres of society (Harvey, 2005). The reason I am combining 
both neoliberalism and McDonaldization in my analysis is because I argue that the four 
tenets of the latter (predictability, calculability, efficiency, control) are a representation 
of market rationality.  
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 The importance of the analysis that I am undertaking is that it can help in 
understanding the issues that surround modern capital punishment, as well as how 
capital punishment is legitimated. As I mentioned, there has been much written about 
capital punishment, a large portion of which is concerned with the issues or problems 
that plague the system. Recent work by Steiker and Steiker (2014, 2016) has focused on 
the problems that have arisen from the complex decisions of the Supreme Court which 
have dealt with capital law. They have also explored how the appearance of strict, 
rationalized regulation has been a legitimating agent that has helped the death penalty 
to continue on in America. However, I posit that there is a gap in our current 
understanding of the issues and legitimating forces that exist within capital punishment, 
and that my analysis offers a new way to expand the current knowledge-base that 
surrounds the death penalty.  
The reason I argue this is, firstly, McDonaldization itself is a legitimating force. 
This is something which Ritzer (2013) hints at, but does not tread into in-depth. 
However, it is obvious by understanding how McDonaldization operates that it has the 
ability to reify. An example of this would be the fast food industry, which is objectively 
harmful to society, yet which is one of the most successful business sectors in the world, 
and which has become ingrained within our society. As Ritzer (2013) notes, people long 
for the four tenets of McDonaldization in their everyday lives, and are willing to 
overlook numerous issues (or “irrationalities”), such as ill health, in order to have them. 
Secondly, McDonaldization can provide a better understanding of the issues within 
capital punishment through the irrationality of rationality. The irrationality of rationality 
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is defined broadly as “a label for many of the negative aspects of McDonaldization” 
(Ritzer, 2013, p. 123). Ritzer (2013) acknowledges the dialectical nature of 
McDonaldization and rationalization in general when he mentions that “irrationality can 
be seen as the opposite of rationality” (p. 123). By acknowledging the dialectic inherent 
in rationalization, we can understand that McDonaldization will inevitably produce 
irrationalities, and hence reproduce itself in an effort to address them. We might also 
say that the more rationalization a system is subject to, the more irrationalities that will 
manifest. In terms of the death penalty, the increasing regulation and rationalization 
that it is subject to will result in more irrationalities popping up over time. With these 
comes a reproduction of rationalities.  
There is a good deal of literature concerning neoliberal theory that is available. I 
have chosen to rely mainly two sources which I feel provide adequate accounts of 
neoliberalism, and do so from different angles. In the second chapter, I draw much from 
Harvey’s (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism, which as the name suggests, accounts 
for the spread of neoliberalism around the globe, as well as why and how it is 
implemented. Harvey (2005) also discusses the theoretical side of neoliberalism and 
how it compares to its actual implementation in practice, pointing out certain 
contradictions between the two. The other main source I draw from is Dean’s (2010) 
Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, specifically the eighth chapter, 
which focuses on neoliberalism. Dean (2010) goes down a much different avenue than 
does Harvey (2005), as he addresses neoliberalism mostly from a theoretical basis. What 
Dean’s (2010) account best explains is the bio-politics of neoliberalism, as well as how it 
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reinforces its own legitimacy. While quite different in their approaches, together these 
works provide a solid, broad understanding of neoliberalism.  
 Also included along with the discussion on neoliberalism will be one concerning 
classical liberalism. This is important because, as we will see, the former borrows much 
of its ideology from the latter. And while one does not necesarrally have to be versed in 
classical liberalism to grasp neoliberalism, it certainly helps to understand where 
neoliberalism comes from in order to understand its underlying assumptions and 
motives. Here again I draw on Dean’s (2010) work in Governmentality in order to lay out 
the theoretical basis of classical liberalism. The discussion is not intended to be an 
exhaustive examination of either classical or neoliberalism, but rather a brief overview 
of the tenets that they share, are most applicable to modern capital punishment, and 
that have intersectionality with McDonaldization.  
The third chapter will then provide a condensed historical overview of capital 
punishment in the United States, both in terms of law and administration. In the 
neoliberal era, the Supreme Court has taken on the task of legislating capital 
punishment using highly technical language and procedure (Garland, 2010). However, 
such was not the case in the pre-modern era (the pre-Furman period) when capital 
punishment was rarely regulated in any way by the Court. Where instructions were 
given, their content was mostly at the full discretion of the presiding judge (Bohm, 
2012). Hence, this paper will explore the pre-modern era to understand both the setting 
in which the Court’s decisions concerning capital punishment in the 1970’s took place, 
and how capital punishment was operating before Furman v. Georgia temporarily shut it 
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down. In addition, I will provide an account of the important cases and features of 
capital punishment in the modern era as well in order to lay the groundwork for the 
next chapter.  
The fourth chapter is where I will fill in the gap that I argue exists by applying the 
four tenets of McDonaldization to the institution of modern American capital 
punishment. I draw on the work of Ritzer (2013) to first establish the bounds of 
McDonaldization, which as he demonstrates is pervasive in numerous areas of society. I 
will then explore both capital jurisprudence and administration during the modern era 
to show that McDonaldization is a useful heuristic for expanding upon current 
understanding of the American death penalty. Ritzer’s (2013) concept of “the 
irrationality of rationality” (p. 15) will also be used to explore some of the issues that 
plague modern capital punishment. Specifically, in the irrationality section, I will analyze 
the problems, or “irrationalities”, that have inevitably resulted from rationalization.  
The final chapter will then examine the implications of my analysis. Ritzer (2013) 
says that McDonaldization is not likely to go away, but will instead spread to new areas. 
This is precisely because it spawns from the very irrationalities that it itself generates. 
This is similar to the view of Weber, whom Ritzer (2013) draws upon heavily. According 
to Feldman (1991), Weber thought that formal rationality, which is deeply ingrained in 
McDonaldization, would continue to overtake the West, then spread to the rest of the 
world (which it has). We have no reason then to think any different of the McDonaldized 
death penalty. Assuming the death penalty continues on in America, we can be sure it 
will not “DeMcDonaldize” and revert to an earlier state. Rather, it is much more likely 
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that the iron cage will close around it ever more, with more complex, technical 
regulation and rationalization. This is not to say that McDonaldization does not change. 
Ritzer (2013) explores a few ways McDonaldization adapts to changing climates, and we 
can expect the same of the death penalty. However, despite change, the four tenets and 
the principles of McDonaldization stay the same, as does the likelihood of it producing 
irrationalities, and further rationalities in response.  
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Chapter 2 
Classical Liberal and Neoliberal Theory 
 
This chapter will briefly explore some of the tenets of classical liberalism and 
neoliberalism. The discussion here is not meant to be an in depth analysis of either, as 
that is not necessary for this thesis. Rather, the point here is to lay the groundwork for 
an understanding of the tenets that are most applicable to developments in American 
capital punishment over the last 40 or so years.  
Classical Liberalism 
The roots of classical liberalism can be traced back to the archaic Greeks 
(Garland, 2010), when influential philosophes such as Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle were 
espousing radical ideas (for the time) that would be later picked back upon during the 
Enlightenment by some of the West’s most renowned “modern” thinkers. However, in a 
general sense, during the Classical Age liberalism was a fringe line of thought that was, 
for the most part, confined to extra-governmental intellectuals. Liberalism was broadly 
a philosophical concept that did not yet penetrate society or greatly influence political 
or economic policy (Garland, 2010). The emergence of classical liberalism as a political 
force used to effect change did not occur until the Enlightenment, largely (but certainly 
not exclusively) during the latter half of the 18th century (Young, 1981). Also, as Young 
(1981) notes, it was not until this time that the tenets of classical liberalism were 
applied to issues such as criminality.   
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The tenet perhaps most well-known and foundational to classical liberalism is 
that of individual freedom. I say that this tenet is foundational because many of the 
other tenets discussed below are based upon it. Garland (2010) states that classical 
liberalism envisages a “social order that values individual freedom and autonomy” (p. 
136). Importantly, the freedoms that individuals are entitled to cannot be granted by a 
despot, but are natural in their origin. The distinction matters because rights that are 
not granted by a despot cannot then be recanted by the despot. Considering that the 
Enlightenment was a reaction against the often cruel and repressive practices that 
European despots employed against their citizens, such as the notorious Ancien Regime, 
it is no surprise that the classical liberals who emerged during this era would favor the 
idea of rights that were bound up in nature. 
Another central tenet of classical liberal theory is that of self-determination, 
which goes hand-in-hand with individual freedom. As Young (1981) writes, the classical 
liberal view of man is that of the “sovereign individual” (p. 6) who can decide upon 
where his interests lay, and thus ought to be free to rationally determine what ends to 
pursue for himself. Of course, the underlying assumption here is that humans are 
universally endowed with reason, and can act rationally when faced with a choice or 
obstacle. The notion that individuals are rational and can choose with course of action is 
best for them (and by extension those around them, such as family) leads into three 
other important tenets of classical liberalism: proportional justice, limited government, 
and market freedom. 
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As mentioned prior, the Enlightenment was a reaction to the often iron-fisted 
rule of European monarchies, one part of which was the lack of any real, rationalized 
apparatus of “justice”. Instead, the accused were regularly given harsh sentences for 
relatively minor offences, and the death penalty was used often and as part of a 
gruesome spectacle as a state building exercise (Foucault, 1995). Seeking to guard 
against the arbitrary justice of the monarchs, classical liberals such as Bentham and 
Beccaria argued for justice that was proportional to the crime committed (Young, 1981). 
They also argued that justice should be ensconced in law so that the people, the rational 
beings, would know the consequences were they to transgress. Thus, classical liberal 
thought led to changes in the death penalty, as it began to be reserved for heinous 
crimes that were deemed proportionate (Paternoster et al, 2007). As Garland (2010) 
points out, the “early-modern death penalty had been phrased in the language of 
tradition, of religion, and of the divine right of kings” (p. 137). As classical liberalism took 
hold, the language shifted to the death penalty’s utility for things like deterrence and 
crime control, which are still repeated today, at least at an ideological level. So, while 
classical liberalism narrowed the scope of the death penalty, it also provided an avenue 
for its continuation, provided that those in power could frame it within the proper 
justifications and rationales.  
The liberal conception of government, which in many ways continues to 
dominate Western society to this day, is one of limited government interference. As was 
previously mentioned, this idea flows from the tenet of individual freedom, which holds 
that the individual is sovereign and thus entitled to certain rights. The job of the 
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government under classical liberalism then becomes to ensure the protection of these 
rights, and to properly restrain itself from encroaching upon them (Dean, 2010). One of 
the central notions of classical liberalism is of course the social contract, which assumes 
that society was formed as a pact, created at the consent of the governed so that they 
may be protected by civilized government (Young, 1981). The important assumptions 
here are that people are naturally evil, that these evils must be kept in check by 
government, and that government gets its legitimacy from the people. Thus, a 
government by the people should also be for the people, protecting the typical (but 
sometimes varying) classical liberal rights such as liberty, security, and property (Young, 
1981).  
The last tenet which will be discussed is the freedom of the market. As classical 
liberalism sees people as naturally free and rational, capable of making their own 
decisions, it holds to reason that the market ought to be open so that citizens will be 
able to exercise their rational choice in the best way possible. In other words, individuals 
“should self-govern as responsible subjects” (emphasis in original) (Dean, 2010, p. 136). 
Many classical liberals, such as Adam Smith, conceived of the free market economy as a 
natural order, separate from society that was bound to be reached and would constitute 
an end to history (Callinocos, 2011). However, classical liberalism also sees the need for 
regulation in order to provide for the rights of the lower classes, as well as to hold 
together “the fragility of the conflict-ridden unity of society” (Dean, 2010). This is 
evidenced by the conception of the welfare state by many Western nations.  
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There are numerous contradictions within classical liberalism, a discussion of 
which is outside of the scope of this chapter. However, the contradiction concerning 
limited government has particular relevance to modern capital punishment. Seeing as 
people are theoretically free under classical liberalism, and the government is supposed 
to be set up so as to ensure freedom, it would seem that people would be free to act as 
they wish, so long as they do not behave criminally. However, as Dean (2010) discusses, 
liberalism seeks to ensure that citizens practice freedom in a way that it beneficial to the 
norms and values that it itself holds to be essential. In other words, the practice of 
freedom requires certain guidelines and “regulating principle(s)” (Dean, 2010, p. 143) so 
as to ensure that citizens act accordingly. If too many citizens use their “freedom” to 
read Marx and decide upon a socialist revolution, then what good is the freedom from 
the perspective of liberalism? This controlled/structured choice-making is in 
contradiction with liberalism’s notion of freedom, as it places limits upon it; it is also in 
tension with the notion of limited government, as the regulation of freedom can lead to 
expansive government. This contradiction is noticeable in modern capital punishment in 
the form of the rationalized juror instructions (which will be further explored in chapter 
four) meant to guide how capital jurors exercise their choice.  
Neoliberalism 
 Neoliberalism can be described as the “dominant rationality of government” 
(Dean, 2010, p. 176) the world over. While classical liberalism was mainly confined to 
the Western world, neoliberalism, by hook or by crook, has branched out beyond the 
West to the likes of China, Chile, Slovakia, and numerous other nations (Harvey, 2005). 
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This means that, as Harvey (2005) discusses, there are varying forms of neoliberalism. 
For instance, neoliberalism was introduced to Chile via authoritarianism, while in the US 
it was “freely” elected into office. However, in spite of this variation, there are central 
tenets to neoliberalism that can be found wherever its hegemonic gaze has reached. 
The following discussion will briefly explore the main tenets of neoliberalism, focusing 
mainly on what we might call the Western tradition, as it is most applicable to American 
capital punishment.  
 First, it should be noted that neoliberal theory has quite a bit in common with 
classical liberalism. For instance, the belief in individual freedom is theoretically 
foundational to both. (Harvey, 2005). However, there are of course differences between 
the two in regards to what that freedom means, and how exactly it should manifest 
itself. We might say that neoliberalism goes further in its belief in individual freedom 
than does classical liberalism, as evidenced by Margaret Thatcher’s famous quote “there 
is no such thing as society”. As Dean (2010) discusses, this quotation is a reflection of 
the fact that neoliberalism greatly privileges individualism over social obligation. This is 
quite different from classical liberalism, which has a strong belief in civil society and 
collective responsibility (Dean, 2010). Also classical liberalism sees individual liberty as 
something that is natural, stemming either from a creator or from the natural 
sovereignty of the people (Dean, 2010). For neoliberalism though, freedom is “a 
technical instrument in the achievement of governmental purposes and objectives” 
(Dean, 2010, p. 182). In other words, freedom arises from processes of government, and 
is the result of a certain type of governmentality. As such, it serves governmental 
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purposes, and by implication, the interests of groups with greater control over 
government and economy.  
 Both classical liberalism and neoliberalism share the notion of responsible 
individual freedom, which was discussed earlier in this chapter; however, neoliberalism 
has a different conception of it. Given that neoliberalism holds freedom to be the result 
of governmentality, it would then seem that “free” choice no longer stems from reason, 
or at least not from reason alone. Put another way, reason does not operate in a 
vacuum. Neoliberalism does not recognize a “natural interest” (Dean, 2010, p. 186); it 
creates interest. Freedom becomes something that is “calculable and (can be) 
manipulated by working on the environment and spaces within which it is exercised” 
(Dean, 2010, p. 186). This means, in short, that neoliberalism applies market rationality 
to individual behavior, seeing it as amenable to manipulation for its purposes.  
This then leads us to the next tenet of neoliberalism, which is the sanctity of the 
free market. Here again is another example of a tenet which neoliberalism derives from 
classical liberalism, but which pushes the logic further. As mentioned in the previous 
section, classical liberalism’s belief that the government must provide for and protect 
the individual rights of all citizens (hence its emphasis on collectivism) leads to its belief 
in what Dean (2010) refers to as “social insurance” (p. 179), best exemplified by the 
welfare state. However, because neoliberal theory holds that people are only truly free 
as long as the market is also free, such regulation as a social safety net would entail is 
problematic (Harvey, 2005). When social services are provided, it is best according to 
neoliberal theory that they be offered by private organizations, which operate according 
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to market logic, and are framed as being more efficient than governmental bureaucracy 
(Harvey, 2005).  
Neoliberalism also goes a step further in its belief in the free market than 
classical liberalism by seeking to insert market rationality into as many spheres as 
possible (Dean, 2010). This is done so as to make these other spheres, such as 
healthcare (Ritzer, 2013), operate as productively as does the fee market (according to 
neoliberal theory). A useful way to think about market rationality is through the lens of 
Ritzer’s (2013) concept of McDonaldization, which will be discussed in much greater 
depth in chapter 4.  Briefly though, the four tenets of McDonaldization are: 
predictability, calculability, efficiency, and control. We can consider these tenets integral 
to market rationality in that any system which seeks to operate as neoliberals envision 
the free market operating must conform to them. Private entities (which control many 
spheres under neoliberalism), and any entity which operates according to the bottom 
line, must especially adhere to these tenets. And, as Harvey (2005) discusses, in cases of 
privatization, which involves private property rights, neoliberalism holds that the state 
should “use its power to impose or invent market systems” (p. 65). What this means is 
that the state should set clear rules, or laws that define private property rights (Harvey, 
2005). This inevitably leads to an increase in what Weber referred to as “formally 
rational legal thought” (Feldman, 1991, p. 227), or, law that is rational in that it is 
increasingly predictable. Essentially, technical, complex law and market rationality go 
hand in hand, and must be inserted in the same spheres (again, think healthcare) so that 
the system may operate according to the tenets laid out by Ritzer (2013). What this also 
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reveals is a contradiction in neoliberalism; the state should stay out of the economy, but 
the need to protect privatization and private property rights dictates clear legal 
boundaries which must be dictated by the state (Harvey, 2005). The effect is a light hand 
of regulative tendencies at the top of the class strata coupled with a heavy one at lower 
levels (Wacquant, 2010).  
The last feature of neoliberalism to be discussed here is its penchant for elitism 
(Harvey, 2005, Burton, 2013). This, like the other features that have been discussed, has 
roots in classical liberalism. As Callinicos (2011) discusses, the most famous classical 
liberals were liberal nobles who often sought to establish constitutional monarchies by 
enacting enlightened reform rather than through revolution. These same nobles were 
wary of giving too much power to the people, as evidenced in places like the United 
States and France where property requirements made it so that only a small proportion 
of the population (mostly bourgeoisie men) could vote. This is precisely why Harvey 
(2005) describes neoliberalism as “suspicious of democracy” (p. 66), a characterization 
that might appear odd considering the prevalence of democracy in many neoliberal 
nations, especially in the United States and Europe. However, neoliberalism can 
institute elitist tendencies within democratic nations. For instance, the redistribution of 
wealth in New York City in the early to mid-1970’s is characterized by Harvey (2005) as 
“a coup by the financial institutions against the democratically elected government” (p. 
45), which resulted increasingly in power being consolidated by the financial elite. New 
York was only the beginning, as the decades after have seen a continuing shift of power 
towards financial elites (Harvey, 2005) Extensive regulation and deregulation have also 
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favored elites (Burton, 2013); laws such as the Citizens United ruling have allowed the 
super-rich to have an integral role in politics, as well as further wedding the political and 
economic spheres.   
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Chapter 3 
A Historical Overview of American Capital Punishment 
 
 There are various time period classifications for mapping the history of capital 
punishment. The two sources I have drawn from the most in regards to time period are 
Garland (2010) and Paternoster et al (2007), the former constructing a more European 
based model, and the latter focusing solely on the United States of America. I have 
drawn from Garland (2010) for purposes of organization and information; however, my 
breakdown of capital punishment eras most closely resembles the model of Paternoster 
et al (2007). My classification is broader however, as I have dichotomized the death 
penalty into two eras: the pre-modern era, lasting from colonial times until the Furman 
decision, and the modern era, encompassing the time from after Furman up until the 
present day. The early and pre-modern eras have been combined because the purpose 
of this chapter is to provide a succinct account of the history of American capital 
punishment, and the modern rationalized era is most relevant to the central argument 
of this thesis.  
Early and Pre-Modern Administration  
While today capital punishment in America is restricted to a small number of 
offenses, most of them having to do with aggravated murder, in the Thirteen Colonies it 
was applied to a laundry list of criminal acts (Banner, 2003). In this way, the colonies 
were not much different from much of the rest of the Western world. Indeed, given that 
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most colonies adopted their laws from England’s “Bloody Code” (which was especially 
notorious for making numerous property offenses punishable by death), it is no surprise 
that acts as “robbery, burglary, arson, counterfeiting, (and) theft” (Banner, 2003, p. 5), 
among many others, were by law capital offenses. There was though differentiation 
between the northern colonies and their mother country concerning crimes that were 
marked as capital, which is to be expected considering that capital punishment was (and 
still is in many ways) a local affair (Garland, 2010); concerning property crimes, in 
general, capital punishment was not sought nearly as often in the north for property 
offenses, and a smaller number of property crimes were punishable by death than was 
the case in England (Banner, 2003). Steiker and Steiker (2016) and Banner (2003) both 
note that capital punishment in the northern colonies had a heavy religious influence as 
well, much more so than under English law. This bend towards the protection of Biblical 
values was due in large part to the fact that many northern colonies were founded by 
religious groups, such as the Quakers.  
 As one would expect, the administration of capital punishment in the southern 
colonies was quite different from that in the north. While in the north the death penalty 
was used as punishment for a wide range of morality offenses, it resembled more 
closely the English common law in the south (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). The south had an 
economy built on slavery during this time, and white slave owners employed terror to 
preserve their economic system and property rights. Thus, more capital offenses 
focused on property, and a large number of those executed were current or former 
slaves (Acker, 2003). Just as the Bloody Code in England served to base the enforcement 
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of the criminal law around terror (Hay et al., 1975), the death penalty in the southern 
colonies was intended to strike fear in the hearts of slaves, serving as a message that 
conveyed the consequences of non-conformity to the slave economy. Naturally, since 
the goal of capital punishment in the South was often to scare and deter potential 
insurrectional behavior, the methods used were often more gruesome than in the 
north, with slaves often being tortured before execution (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). 
Naturally, too, the line between legal and extra-legal executions was thinner.  
 As time went on, and the US moved through and then out of the Enlightenment 
era, the number of capital offenses narrowed significantly (Garland, 2010). Indeed, 
given that America was founded during the Enlightenment on “enlightened principals”, 
and was led by white liberal nobles, we would then expect its capital punishment 
apparatus to follow the rest of the Western world in becoming more “civilized.” Starting 
in the 1790’s in Pennsylvania, attempts to narrow the death penalty became common 
across numerous states. The now common practice of dividing murder into various 
“degrees” started with the Pennsylvania statute passed in 1794 (Steiker & Steiker, 
2016). Nearly all attempts to narrow or do away with the death penalty in the early days 
of the republic were led by American Enlightenment thinkers who had often been 
influenced by European intellectuals such as Beccaria. As Steiker and Steiker (2016) 
point out, John Hancock in Massachusetts, John Jay in New York, and Thomas Jefferson 
(all Enlightenment disciples) were, among others, leaders of the charge against the 
overreach of capital punishment for lesser crimes.  
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 Throughout the nineteenth century, other states took on the issue of capital 
punishment as well. On the eve of the Civil War, all northern states had narrowed death 
eligible crimes to murder and treason (Banner, 2003). Complete abolition was realized 
in Rhode Island and Wisconsin, and as Steiker and Steiker (2016) note, “Michigan 
became the first English-speaking jurisdiction in the world to abolish the death penalty 
for murder” (p. 11). The narrowing of capital offenses also took place in the southern 
states. As Banner (2003) points out: “By the Civil War capital punishment for whites 
was, with a few exceptions, in practice reserved for murder throughout the South nearly 
as much as in the North” (p. 139). However, though reform of crimes eligible for capital 
punishment did happen in the southern states, it was only applicable to whites (Steiker 
& Steiker, 2016).  
 As the death penalty became increasingly more civilized, the arena for its display 
changed as well. The spectacle surrounding executions began to wither around the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, and middle to upper class folk began to see 
attending a public execution as something beneath their status (Banner, 2003). 
Considering that “it is not clear that actual practices had changed so significantly” 
(Steiker & Steiker, 2016, p.12), the change in perception appears a bit odd. Even more, 
Banner (2003) points out that executions in pre-modern America were often somber 
events (with a few notable exceptions). This shift in the populace toward more 
enlightened sensibilities (what the Supreme Court has referred to as “evolving standards 
of decency”) coincided roughly with the transition from public to private executions 
carried out inside prison walls. Steiker and Steiker (2016) note that the trend toward 
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private executions began in the 1830’s, and by the end of the nineteenth century, “the 
vast majority of states had passed private execution statutes” (p. 12).  
 The move of executions to private areas is in part a reflection of a broader trend 
in Western society, namely that of rationalization (an increase in formal rationality) and 
bureaucratization. This is to say, Western society has increasingly become concerned 
with Ritzer’s (2013) four tenets of rationalization: predictability, calculability, efficiency, 
and control. There is no clear starting point for the trend towards rationalization, and at 
least some measure of rationality and bureaucracy has been present in nearly all 
societies (the Roman Empire had a highly complex imperial governing system with a 
large bureaucracy). However, what we can say is that the desire for more formally 
rational systems and institutions became more widespread in the nineteenth century 
(around the time Weber was writing), no doubt spurred on by the development of 
capitalism and industrialization. When comparing public and private executions through 
the lens of rationality, we see that private executions are much more in line with formal 
rationality. 
Public executions did not provide a high measure of predictability because they 
included potentially thousands of actors with agency who could act in any number of 
uncertain ways. Though crowds at American executions were often relatively mild-
mannered (Banner, 2003), there was always a chance that a riot or fight could break 
out, interrupting the proceedings (which did happen on numerous occasions). Public 
executions were often overseen by the local sheriff (Banner, 2003), himself a 
governmental official. However the actual executioner could be someone picked off the 
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street, a volunteer, or even a convict given the job in exchange for clemency (Banner, 
2003). Thus, it is safe to say that public executions were not professional, and a lot could 
go wrong, such as the accidental decapitation of the person being hanged (Banner, 
2003).  
Private executions on the other hand, while not at all free of irrationality, at least 
aimed to be more rational, and fulfilled formally rational goals more so than public 
executions. Executions conducted in private, such as in a prison setting, are more 
predictable simply by the elimination of the crowd, and increased control over 
witnesses. These changes cut down on the threat of mob violence significantly, and 
allow those conducting the execution to be more certain about how the proceedings are 
going to unfold. Also, private executions came increasingly to be conducted by 
“officials” or “experts.” Coinciding with the rise of the prison, private executions were 
often themselves conducted by jail officials who had experience in the matter, and who 
were more likely to do the job right than some vagabond off the street (Banner, 2003). I 
do not say all of this to imply that pre-modern executions served no purpose, or that 
they were completely irrational. How much rationality is present within a system can 
vary across a spectrum, and institutions like pre-modern capital punishment do not 
always fit neatly into one category of rationalization. Indeed, from a functionalist 
perspective, it seems clear that pre-modern capital punishment served much more of a 
purpose in society than does modern capital punishment, which is itself relegated 
largely to a symbolic function (Garland, 2010). Pre-modern, public executions fulfilled 
what Weber called substantively rational goals, or goals that are important to 
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individuals or the local community for expressive purposes (Feldman, 1991). For 
example, as Banner (2003) rightly points out, public executions served a religious 
function in that they gave the criminal a chance to repent before God and the 
community, which many felt was necessary for the community so that it may heal after 
the chaos of criminal action. The death penalty was also a symbolic marker of status, 
and in the South, race (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). Durkheim would point to the re-
affirmation of religious and status norms as exemplary of the communicative function of 
the death penalty during this time period. 
Along with the move from public to private executions, the change in execution 
methods during the nineteenth century was also part of a larger process that served to 
modernize the death penalty. From the time of the colonies until around the beginning 
of the Civil War, the primary method of execution had been hanging (Steiker & Steiker, 
2016), which was in large part a legacy of America’s ties with England. However, during 
the middle to late nineteenth century, when the death penalty was undergoing 
processes of rationalization and modernization, new execution methods began to take 
hold (Garland, 2010). As mentioned prior, hanging could be an unpredictable execution 
method. It was often carried out by someone who was not qualified, and even if it was 
done under the supervision of a “professional”, there was always the chance that the 
person being executed might not die right away, or that they may be partially or wholly 
decapitated (Banner, 2003). In essence, hanging is not a very rational way to execute 
someone; it does not provide a high measure of predictability, and because the hanged 
may not die right away if something goes awry, it does not provide a large degree of 
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efficiency. Also, hanging (especially when something goes wrong a la decapitation) does 
not fit well with Enlightenment sensibilities, and, during a time when industrialization 
was taking hold and new machines and forms of technology were popping up daily, 
hanging seemed to be an archaic and barbaric way to execute criminals. In contrast, 
new forms of technology like the electric chair were touted as providing a humane 
alternative to hanging (Steiker & Steiker, 2016), and were (in theory) more rational and 
knowledge-based. 
In addition, the previous two forms of death penalty modernization were 
complemented by the move from purely local administration of the death penalty to 
greater centralization of process (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). Executions in America had 
always been a local affair for a few obvious reasons. One, during colonial times, the 
colonies were an ocean away from their father country, and thus local rule was 
necessary for governance. Also, once America became a republic, the states retained a 
lot of autonomy and were wary of giving too much power to a centralized government 
because of perceived overreach by the English during the colonial days. Therefore, 
death penalty administration was then, as it is now, a reflection of broader 
governmental administration; capital punishment administration in contemporary times 
is rationalized, bureaucratized, and centralized, much like the modern system of 
governance in general.  
The modernization of the death penalty resulted in a change in who oversaw the 
proceedings. Until around the time of the Civil War, the job was carried out by the local 
sheriff (Banner, 2003). However, due to the centralizing and rationalizing ethic 
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mentioned prior, the job was then tasked to state “officials” who were qualified to 
oversee executions in a manner that fit in with the desires for modernization and the 
change in public sensibilities concerning violence and visible trauma. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that, while it became less local during the pre-modern era, 
capital punishment was still tied with localism (Garland, 2010). Centralization took place 
mostly at the state level, with the federal government largely staying away from 
regulation or intervention during this era. This is made clear by examining the difference 
in administration across the states. To cite an extreme example, Michigan executed its 
last person in 1830 when it was still a territory. Texas, on the other hand, became (and 
still is to this day) notorious for executing criminals. Indeed, the high number of 
executions carried out in Texas throughout history is a peculiar point of pride for many 
people (though the number executed has dropped off significantly). This difference also 
highlights the divide between north and south in America, itself another reflection of 
localism tied with capital punishment.  
Naturally, all these factors I have mentioned- the change in public sentiment, the 
narrowing of capital crimes, the desire for rationalized governance- led to a decline in 
executions during the later years of the pre-modern era, culminating in 1968 when the 
ten year moratorium began (Bohm, 2012). Decline can be noticed in the late nineteenth 
century. However as Banner (2003) points out, the early twentieth century saw the 
most significant decline. While for much of American history the number of annual 
executions was measured in the hundreds, by the late 1950’s, the number had dropped 
to double digits (Banner, 2003). Banner (2003) also points out that, while decline 
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happened in the south as well, the north saw the largest decline in both usage of and 
support for the death penalty, which resulted in a shift in death penalty practice 
geographically from north to south.  
The death penalty also saw a decrease in public support in the early twentieth 
century, and Banner (2003) lays out a few reasons why this took place. One reason is 
that there was a rethinking of capital punishment’s deterrent value during this time. 
Capital punishment had not always been linked with deterrence or crime control in 
general during the pre-modern period. Instead, these types of formally rational goals 
had started to be assigned to capital punishment as it came to be increasingly 
rationalized (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). And while the deterrent value of the death 
penalty may have been afforded hegemonic common sense status for some time, in the 
early twentieth century, more people began to try to ascertain whether it was “good 
sense” (Harvey, 2005) that the death penalty worked as a deterrent. The debate 
concerning deterrence in general was changing during this time period as well, as social 
science underwent numerous changes (Banner, 2003). The cause or causes of crime, 
once thought to be well known, were being thrown in to question. In particular, Cesare 
Lombroso’s idea of the “criminal man”, which postulated that certain people were 
predisposed to criminality, threw a wrench in criminological thought. Banner (2003) 
notes that, as biological positivism became more widespread, people began to question 
whether deterrence could work at all.  
Another reason Banner (2003) gives is the rise of data and empirical thinking 
within social science. For the first time, murder rates could be compared in places with 
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and without the death penalty to measure its effectiveness as a deterrent. The results of 
the analyses were not always favorable for capital punishment, as many results showed 
that places without capital punishment often had lower murder rates (Banner, 2003). 
While statistical analysis did not sway the opinions of many by itself, it did have the 
effect of casting more doubt onto the efficacy and necessity of capital punishment.  
Lastly, the racial disparity of capital punishment during the early twentieth 
century is important as well. After the formal end of slavery, many southern whites 
viewed capital punishment as necessary to control a “primitive, animalistic black 
population” (Banner, 2003, p. 140). This is one reason why the primary location of the 
death penalty shifted from the north to the south. While sentiment in the south was 
pro-capital punishment, in the north, concerns about lynching and civility were more 
common (Banner, 2003). Lynching and capital punishment were closely linked during 
this time period, and it offended the sensibilities of many people in the north, as well as 
some in the south, that capital punishment was so disproportionately employed against 
black people. Even more troubling to many people perhaps was the fact that, for crimes 
not involving murder, such as rape or property offenses, black people were 
overwhelmingly more likely to be executed than white people (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). 
In fact, there is no record of a white person being executed for rape in the South after 
the Civil War (Banner, 2003). The disproportionate racial bias of capital punishment 
caused many to withdraw their support for the institution.  
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Pre-Modern Legal Transitions 
 As discussed earlier, the administration of capital punishment in the pre-modern 
period was characterized in large part by localism and a lack of intervention by the 
federal government. Much of the same can be said concerning the legal issues with 
capital punishment during this time period. While in modern times the US Supreme 
Court has made a point of regulating and intruding upon death penalty practice, before 
1968, it heard only two cases that were a threat to capital punishment’s 
constitutionality (Bohm, 2012): Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, which will be 
discussed later in the chapter, and Solesbee v. Balkcom, “which allowed a governor to 
determine an inmate’s sanity” (Bohm, 2012, p. 24). However, as Steiker and Steiker 
(2016) point out, this was not because of the lack of opportunity, as there were 
numerous calls and appeals for the Court to step in and address the institution’s many 
ailments. We can likewise not say that members of the Court were completely apathetic 
to the need to regulate capital punishment. Rather, we know the Court to be a 
pragmatic body, and the lack of intervention reflects their desire to preserve the status 
quo of governance. While not the only course the Court could have taken, their non-
interventionist stance was much a reflection of power and politics of the era (Steiker & 
Steiker, 2016). Indeed, Steiker and Steiker (2016) mention that the Court was often 
reluctant to take on capital punishment because of the fear that reprisals in the form of 
mob justice and lynching would become even more widespread, particularly in the 
south.  In essence, the legalistic death penalty served as a release valve for the tension 
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and anger that builds up around cases where the public or state has an interest in seeing 
the defendant put to death.  
 Thus, the Supreme Court’s non-regulative stance means that there are not a 
plethora of cases that had much of an impact during the premodern era. This does not 
mean, however, that the Court stayed out of death penalty affairs completely (Bohm, 
2012). As Steiker and Steiker (2016) note, calls for the Court to decide on capital 
punishment matters began during the nineteenth century, with most challenges being 
levied against execution methods (p. 26-27). From this we can notice that, when the 
Court did dabble in regulating the death penalty during this era, its stance was often 
much in tune with that of liberal nobles, otherwise known as the prime movers of 
Enlightenment thought. One aspect of the Enlightenment often overlooked is that it was 
not from the start a democratic movement. Rather, Enlightenment ideals sprang in 
general from liberal nobles in Western Europe (and to a lesser extent the United States 
as well). Often put off by the sentiments of the common man, liberal Enlightenment 
thinkers fancied themselves above the notions of the herd, and sought to impose upon 
their society modernized and civilized values and sensibilities (Young, 1981). This shift 
toward civilized values can be noticed in America as well during the nineteenth century, 
when many middle and upper class Americans stopped going to and campaigned against 
public executions on the grounds that they were archaic and barbaric (Banner, 2003). 
When hanging was done away with (for the most part at least, the last hanging in 
America occurred in 1994), it would be safe to say that a significant portion of 
Americans still supported the gallows, and were enraged to see it fall by the wayside. 
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Indeed, one has only to look at the number of lynchings in the south (and some in the 
north) to see that a large section of the populace favored a method that liberal nobles 
dismissed as uncivilized.  
In attempting to regulate methods of execution, the Court was playing the part 
of an enlightened body, hoisting its enlightened opinion upon an institution that had yet 
to be brought into the civilized fold. The desire to usher America away from hanging can 
be noticed in the case of Wilkerson v. Utah (1879), the Court’s first challenge to a 
particular execution method’s constitutionality (Bohm, 2012). In this case, the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the firing squad as constitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment (Bohm, 2012). And while the firing squad may not be seen as the most 
civilized method of execution, it was a step away from what many thought to be an 
outmoded method that was borrowed from a mother country with a penal code that 
had the reviled “Bloody” attached to it. I should note that I am not making the argument 
that the Court always played the role of enlightened body vis-a-vis the populace. 
Indeed, as many cases from the pre-modern era show, the Court often took a more 
pragmatic approach, likely trying to strike a balance between civilizing the death penalty 
and releasing the pressure that might result in insurrection in the form of lynching 
(Steiker & Steiker, 2016; Garland, 2010). Wilkerson is actually an example of the Court 
trying to maintain said balance, as it ruled that Utah could use any method of execution 
that was not “cruel and unusual”. I am also not making the argument that Wilkerson 
was a clear message that the Court was sending in regards to its desire to civilize capital 
punishment. However, what is telling about the Wilkerson case is that the Court applied 
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the Eighth Amendment to a territorial statute (and by default all territorial capital 
statutes in terms of what execution methods they used). This is noteworthy because the 
Eighth Amendment, and the rest of the Bill of Rights, would not be determined to apply 
to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment until the 1960’s (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). 
Indeed, there are quite a few cases from this era, some dealing with capital punishment 
but most not, where the Court neglects to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. 
Obviously Utah, as a territory, was afforded different status than a state. However, the 
Court was still intervening in what can be considered local affairs, something it had 
neglected to do before. This case, along with In re Kemmler, when the Court ruled that 
the electric chair was constitutional, both paint the Court as desiring to move away from 
hanging towards more modern, mechanical and ostensibly civilized forms of execution.  
The Court’s enlightened tendencies also become apparent in two cases involving 
appeal on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, the first being Moore v. Dempsey (1923). In 
this case, five black men were tried and convicted of murder of a white man and 
sentenced to death in a trial that was surrounded by an unruly mob and a vitriolic 
atmosphere (Waterman & Overton, 1933). This was an altogether too common 
occurrence in the pre-modern era, particularly in the south. The defendants appealed 
on the grounds that they were not given a fair trial, which a district court subsequently 
dismissed (Bohm, 2012). The Supreme Court however, reversed, mandating a review by 
the lower court. Then in 1932, the Court heard the famous Powell v. Alabama case, also 
known as the Scottsboro Boys case. The Scottsboro Boys were eight young black men 
who were accused of raping two white women (Linder, 2007). Like the Moore cases, the 
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atmosphere surrounding the trial was heated and racially prejudiced; a mob that sought 
to lynch the group the night of their arrest was stopped only when the Alabama 
National Guard was called in (Linder, 2007). As Bohm (2012) notes, the trial was 
remarkably fast as well, with only one week passing from arrest to conviction. The 
defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, which vacated all the convictions due to 
“special circumstances” (Bohm, 2012, p. 36) surrounding the case. What is notable 
about Moore and Powell is that the Court ruled against popular mob sentiment in both 
instances. Not only that, but the Court risked the backlash of lynching that it so sought 
to avoid (Steiker & Steiker, 2016) by deciding against public opinion (at least local public 
opinion, which counted most) in both cases. It is in these cases most of all that we can 
see the Court’s enlightened sentiment, and its knowledge of the need for and desire to 
impose rational regulation on capital punishment. 
Again though, the Court justices did not always behave as enlightened liberal 
nobles during this era. It is perhaps best to view the Court as pragmatic in that the 
justices were trying to balance their own desires for reform (which, based on certain 
cases, are desires we can logically deduce they harbored) with the sentiments of the 
populace, whom they viewed as ready to lash out should the Court upset the balance 
(Steiker & Steiker, 2016). Indeed, were the Court a truly enlightened group, then the 
end results of the Wilkerson and Kemmler cases would have surely called them into 
action to declare both the firing squad and the electrocution chair unconstitutional; 
Wilkerson bled out for nearly half an hour after the bullet missed its mark, and Kemmler 
had a current run through him twice until “Smoke rose from (his) head, and the smell of 
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his burning flesh filled the room” (Steiker & Steiker, 2016, p. 29). Indeed, the Court 
would not take on the issue of two electrocutions to the same person until fifty seven 
years later, and then it ruled in favor of the practice in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. 
Resweber. It is worth noting that Francis was a black man (or perhaps boy, as he was 
only sixteen) who had been convicted of killing a white person in Louisiana, and the 
Court likely feared backlash had it ruled in favor of him.  
The Court’s pandering to the populism is apparent in a case even more abhorring 
than Francis; that of Frank v. Magnum. Frank’s case mirrors several aspects of Francis’: 
racial bias (Frank was a Jew), the victim was white (compounding the crime in the eyes 
of the public), and an enraged populace out for blood (Bohm, 2012). Frank was 
convicted in a trial surrounded by “a charged atmosphere of virulent anti-Semitism” 
(Bohm, 2012, p.34). Frank then appealed his conviction to the Georgia Supreme Court 
on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, claiming the atmosphere surrounding his trial had 
been unfair, and that he had not been tried by an impartial jury due to the outside 
pressure from the mob (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). The Georgia court denied his appeal, 
after which the US Supreme Court did as well, citing the fact that the Georgia court had 
heard his appeal as evidence that he had been provided with “due process of law”. The 
Court’s decision in this case seems clearly aimed at satisfying the blood lust of the mob; 
however it was to no avail. The governor of Georgia (guided by a conscience not 
displayed by the Court) commuted Frank’s sentence to life imprisonment. This had the 
predictable effect of angering the populace even further; Frank was taken from his cell 
by a mob and publicly lynched.  
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The last two capital cases the Court heard in the pre-modern era were 
McGautha v. California (1971), and Furman v. Georgia (1972) (Bohm, 2012). I have not 
included either of these cases within the prior discussions on balancing or enlightening 
because they do not fit well into either category. In McGautha, the Court struck down 
the need the regulate juror discretion so as to protect against arbitrariness, but there 
was no outrage around the case, and no lynch mobs ready to pursue their own brand of 
justice. In fact, popular opinion had been swinging away from capital punishment at the 
time, and the number of capital convictions and executions had been in decline for quite 
some time (Garland, 2010). Instead, it would appear that the Court’s rejection of 
regulation was due to pragmatic concern about the possibility of doing so in a way that 
would work. Justice Harlan, writing the majority opinion in McGautha, famously voiced 
his concern that it was not humanly possible to regulate juror discretion in a way that 
would be sensible and practical (Bohm, 2012). However much Justice Harlan might have 
thought his words would serve as guidance in the future to the Court regarding capital 
punishment cannot be known, but it is doubtful that he believed that the Court would 
go against his advice only a year later. This was the case however, as in 1972 the Court 
struck down capital punishment as then applied with the reasoning that it was plagued 
by arbitrariness due to runaway juror discretion (Bohm, 2012).  
Upon first glance, Furman appears to be a classical liberal case. After all, it was a 
case of liberal elites acting in an enlightened manner, striking down a punishment that 
was a hold-over from the past, and was in decline across the Western world. But upon 
closer inspection, what we see is that Furman was a prelude of what was to come in 
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terms of capital punishment jurisprudence. Had Furman been a purely classic liberal 
decision, it would have done away with capital punishment completely. Instead, the 
Court struck down capital punishment only as it had been, on narrow grounds, leaving 
the door open for revival. In this way Furman set the stage for political backlash and 
capital punishment’s comeback, as well as for the cases that were to be decided in the 
modern era. Indeed, the long term effect of Furman was to technicalize capital 
punishment, to define the limits within which future discussion and jurisprudence would 
take place. This has had the effect of making capital jurisprudence in the modern era 
increasingly technical and complex.  
What can we take away from the Court’s jurisprudence during the pre-modern 
era? As mentioned prior, the Court sought to strike a balance between its own desires 
for central regulation and the desires of the populace, mostly in the south. The Court 
knew the reality of power and politics of this era, and thus took what we might call a 
realistic or pragmatic approach in its decision making. However, it takes a deft hand to 
balance competing sentiments, and that is especially true in this case where the 
competing sentiments (reformism and revanchism) are so at odds with one another. 
The Court, in its desire to balance, showed that it lacked the deft touch, and instead of 
providing sound, middle-of-the-road centrist decisions that satisfied both sides, they 
instead handed down decisions that have no clear rhyme or reason, and can be 
described as schizophrenic. At times the Court did look like an enlightened body, as in 
the case of the Scottsboro Boys. However, other times, as in the case of Leo Frank, the 
Court’s ruling appears entirely unjust, and seems an atrocious attempt to satisfy the 
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people’s desire for revenge. What these two cases also show is that two extremes do 
not balance. This is not to discard the Court’s balancing intent as itself atrocious or 
unnecessary. On the contrary, reality demanded either a balanced approach or a 
complete siding with the populace, and balance is clearly the better of the two. Thus, 
while the Court’s intentions in these cases may have been benevolent, the decisions 
they handed down did not create the balance they sought. The cases established the 
stage for the rationalization of the death penalty.  
Modern Administration and Practice 
 After the moratorium starting in 1968 and ending in 1977, executions began 
anew with Garry Gilmore in Utah, who was executed by firing squad (Lyons, 2000). 
Though the modern era of executions was begun by a firing squad, the method has in no 
way been characteristic of executions since Gregg; only three executions by firing squad 
have been carried out since 1976, all of them in the state of Utah. The dominant 
method of execution in the modern era has been lethal injection, accounting for around 
87 percent of executions. Other forms of execution have managed to persist since the 
Gregg decision; there have been numerous electrocutions, a handful of gas chamber 
executions, and three hangings. However, all these now “archaic” methods of execution 
have existed on the periphery of the modern institution. The modern death penalty has 
been sanitized so as to fit in with current civilized sensibilities, and it has been designed 
so as to not violate current taboos (such as the visibility of pain or blood). Essentially, 
the death penalty has become highly rationalized to conceal suffering and violence.  
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 I discussed rationalization in the pre-modern administration section of this 
chapter as something that was present quite a while before the onset of the modern 
era. Indeed, there were many forms of rationalization that took hold on the death 
penalty during the nineteenth century, such as the move from public to private 
executions. However, while rationalization was present before the modern era, it never 
took hold on the scale that it has in contemporary times. The death penalty today is 
rationalized both in terms of its administration and legality. This does not mean that the 
administration of the death penalty is inherently logical, nor that it even makes sense. In 
fact, as I will discuss later in the chapter, current death penalty administration makes 
little sense. But, what it means is that modern death penalty administration is subject to 
various highly technical laws and procedures that govern how it operates. Lethal 
injection provides for a rationalized death penalty more so than any other method of 
execution before it. Once again, I am not making the claim that lethal injection is the 
best form of execution, but that it best fulfills the managerial goals of the modern death 
penalty. 
 The push towards rationalization has penetrated western society rapidly in the 
last forty to fifty years (Ritzer, 2013), and can be viewed within the larger context of the 
neoliberal turn, which occurred around the mid 1970’s (Harvey, 2005). There are many 
parallels between modern death penalty administration and neoliberal theory, perhaps 
the most obvious of which is the use of lethal injection. Going back to Ritzer’s (2013) 
four tenets-predictability, calculability, efficiency, control-we can see that lethal 
injection satisfies all of them, at least in appearance. Lethal injection is predictable in 
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that it allows officials to determine when cause of death will be with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy, is calculable in that officials can calculate (or at least claim to be 
able to) the exact dosage required to do the job, is efficient in that it works relatively 
quick and (most of the time) without incident, and allows for a high degree of control 
over all actors involved in the execution. It is, in short, amenable to careful 
management.  
 Another integral aspect of neoliberal theory is the marriage of private and public 
institutions. As Harvey (2005) puts it “Neoliberals are particularly assiduous in 
seeking…privatization” (p. 65). This is something that is prevalent and easily noticeable 
in the broader society, such as our military’s close cooperation with civilian contractors 
and mercenary groups in Iraq. Lethal injection is an avenue of intersection of the private 
and public spheres, as the drug or drugs states use for execution come from private 
companies (Denno, 2007) (though it should be noted that some companies, such as 
Pfizer, have stopped providing lethal injection drugs, putting some states in a 
conundrum). States also often rely on private actors from the medical field for 
consultation, oversight, or implementation of lethal injection, something most doctors 
are reluctant to do because of ethical considerations (Denno, 2007).  
 Regulation is a point of contention in neoliberal theory, and in fact creates a 
contradiction. Neoliberal theory espouses a belief in unobstructed individual freedom, 
as well as freedom of the market (Harvey. 2005). Thus, neoliberal theory wants 
government to stay out of market affairs. However, neoliberalism upholds private 
property as sacred and essential to “economic development and the improvement of 
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human welfare” (Harvey, 2005, p. 65). Naturally, the only way to ensure the sanctity of 
private property is via strong state regulation and protection of assets; under the 
neoliberal theory, the government has to regulate. Because of this tension, what occurs 
is tight-fisted regulation of the poor and indigent, also known as people who might be a 
threat to mass accumulation of private property, and loose regulation of people with 
money and/or influence, as well as government officials. The former lack the capacity to 
resist regulation that the latter possess. A blatant example of this in the US is welfare, a 
system so obsessed with regulating and catching fraud that it has employed invasive 
mass surveillance techniques in order to catch perpetrators (Gilliom, 2001). On the 
other side of the coin is Wall Street and the financial sector in general, an area so 
deregulated and abused that it was a major part of the Great Recession of 2007-8. 
However, despite known abuses, the financial sector is lightly regulated, and white 
collar crime often goes by unnoticed.  
 I mention this because the same type of regulation is present in contemporary 
capital punishment. The administration of capital punishment in the modern era 
appears to be tightly regulated. However, upon closer inspection we see that this is not 
always the case, and when it comes to areas that are regulated, the regulation is often 
more symbolic and legitimating than real. Let us think about capital punishment 
regulation in general, which is most stringent when it comes to areas that most visibly 
link it with lynching. The shift in administration from the pre-modern to modern era 
represents a move away from the specter of lynching. While, as mentioned prior, there 
were rationalizing and centralizing forces at work long before the modern era, capital 
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punishment was still a local institution sought for and carried out by local actors 
(Banner, 2003). However, contemporary capital punishment is much more centralized in 
terms of administration. The legal parameters for capital trials are set forth by federal 
law, although there is variation within juror instructions across states. The method and 
site of execution are also centralized and are carried out and determined by state 
officials. There are numerous reasons for a more centralized administration, one of 
them being a desire to decouple the death penalty from its brutal history that involves 
lynching. Garland (2010) says that lynching was an exercise in “local popular justice” (p. 
32), an outcry of anger, frustration, and fear from the community. Centralizing the 
death penalty gives it a civilized appearance that helps to gloss over issues or injustices 
that might exist under the surface, such as overrepresentation of minorities, and affirms 
the state’s monopoly on violence and the use of force, something which lynching 
threatened.   
 There are other factors that link capital punishment to lynching that have been 
symbolically regulated as well. The most fundamental regulation has been targeted at 
juries, which were often a site of atrocious miscarriages of justice in the days of 
lynching. To remedy this problem, juries have been regulated so that they must conform 
to guided discretion (Steiker & Steiker, 2014). And while numerous works, such as that 
of Steiker and Steiker (2014) and Cunningham and Sorensen (2014), have shown that 
guided discretion has many issues and often results in arbitrariness, it has the symbolic 
effect of making the death penalty appear civilized and rationalized, and thus long 
removed from its violent past. The same can also be said of the appeals process, which 
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in theory guards against misconduct and abuse on the part of the state, and ensures 
that defendants are afforded due process. The desire to ensure capital defendants are in 
fact guilty also stems from one of the many problematic issues of the lynching period, 
which was innocence of the defendant. From Leo Frank to the Scottsboro Boys, there 
are numerous high profile cases in which the defendants were wrongly accused, often 
due to racial or cultural bias (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). By having a lengthy appeals 
process, the modern iteration of capital punishment can appear civilized and fair, as if it 
is doing all possible to guard against wrongful convictions (think of the protracted and 
rationalized appeals process).   
 Thus, while capital punishment appears highly rational because of the amount of 
symbolic regulation it is cloaked in, there are issues under the surface that undermine 
rationality, issues and irrationalities which have been subject to little or no regulation. 
The most striking area that has been left largely unregulated is prosecutorial discretion. 
Prosecutors have wide discretion in choosing what charges to levy against a defendant, 
and whether or not to seek a death sentence. This has resulted in a large percentage of 
capital cases being sought by a small number of prosecutors (“America’s Top Five 
Deadliest Prosecutors”, 2016). According to the report “America’s Top Five Deadliest 
Prosecutors: How Overzealous Personalities Drive the Death Penalty”, the total number 
of capital convictions of five prosecutors studied in the report is equal to around 15 
percent of the contemporary death row population. Knowing this, it is no surprise that 
the geographical implementation of capital punishment is highly inconsistent as well. In 
fact, over half of capital cases leading to execution since executions resumed in 1977 
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have come from 2 percent of counties nationwide (“The 2% Death Penalty”, 2013). This 
sort of caprice is particularly troubling for the modern death penalty because it is 
supposedly a rationalized institution, and rationalized institutions need consistency and 
standardization (Feldman, 1991). And, considering that the death penalty was struck 
down by the Supreme Court in 1972 due to arbitrariness, the uneven administration 
becomes even more significant. Centralization has changed who carries out an 
execution, as well as where it occurs, but has done nothing about how capital cases are 
pursued and by whom, thus leaving contradictions under the surface that exists in 
tension with the rest of the rationalized system. The effect is to generate irrationality 
that begets rationalized efforts to regulate and legitimate capital punishment.  
The function of the modern death penalty also warrants consideration. There 
have been works that have addressed the issue of the death penalty’s purpose in 
contemporary times, and for good reason, considering that for such an institution to 
persist, we should like to think that it serves some purpose. What is clear to every 
observer of the modern death penalty is that it is no longer a vehicle for the goals that it 
once was: retribution, deterrence, and, to lesser degrees, incapacitation and cost 
savings. One does not need a deep analysis to realize that the death penalty no longer 
functions to provide for these goals, as it is readily apparent. With the rise of supermax 
prisons, incapacitation of dangerous criminals does not require them to be killed 
(Cunningham & Sorensen, 2014). The death penalty is carried out in too sparse a fashion 
in order to be retributive. It is the case now that someone sentenced to death is more 
likely to die of natural causes than to be executed (Garland, 2010). And those who do 
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meet the fate of execution do so after a lengthy appeals process that takes years and 
can often take decades (Bohm, 2012). Thus, when the execution is carried out, the crime 
to which it is attached may have been forgotten in the public conscience, and there is a 
real possibility that the people who are invested in the execution the most, the victim’s 
family and friends, may have deceased in the time that has passed. This passage of time 
is also a reason why the death penalty has no deterrent effect either (I say all this under 
the assumption that deterrence works at all, which research suggests is questionable). If 
a potential offender cannot with any degree of certainty know they will be put to death, 
then there is no deterrence to be found. Modern methods of execution can also be 
argued to be anti-deterrent, as lethal injection is akin to a highly rationalized medical 
procedure.  
But, just because the death penalty fails to meet the crime control and financial 
goals that many would like for it to, does not mean it is without purpose or function. 
Much as Foucault argues that the failure of penal systems is functional (Garland, 1990), 
it would seem that there is a function that is served by the death penalty despite its 
failure. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, the purposes of the pre-modern death 
penalty were relatively apparent, and one can make the case that the death penalty 
served an important role in the community. The modern death penalty, on the other 
hand, does not serve an apparent purpose (Garland, 2010). Rather, the function of the 
death penalty in contemporary times is much more subtle and subliminal, though that 
does not mean it is not powerful. Garland (2010) discusses Foucault’s functionalist, 
“positive” view of capital punishment, arguing that it is “productive, performative, and 
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generative-that it makes thing happen” (p. 285). Essentially, the contemporary death 
penalty is more about form than substance; it’s about sending a message. Politicians in 
the modern era have used capital punishment as a vehicle for expressing their values, 
such as a support for crime control, victim’s rights, or even a support for conservative 
principles in general (Garland, 2010). More fundamentally, capital punishment, like war, 
symbolizes the state’s power over death, thus promoting subjugation and 
governmentality.  
The broader utilities of capital punishment, such as traditional state building 
among emerging nation-states or crime control in established ones, have changed. The 
death penalty now serves more “private or professional purposes of specific actors” 
(Garland, 2010, p. 286). Indeed, it is clear that the death penalty is not necessary for the 
penal system to function. It should be no surprise then that the death penalty does not 
operate as if it is vital to penal function; only a handful of people are executed annually. 
Whereas once capital punishment served an objective purpose or purposes, today its 
significance is subjective, to be used as a “currency” (Garland, 2010, p. 286) by political 
entrepreneurs who realize that it is attached to other issues, and who know how to 
employ it to their own ends. What becomes clear is that capital punishment serves a 
mostly symbolic function in the modern era, and is largely communicative. And though 
it sends messages about crime, criminals, and victims, the most fundamental imagery 
communicated is in regard to state power, both its exercise and its restraint.  
Saying that the contemporary death penalty is symbolic does not mean that it is 
devoid of instrumental purpose or value. On the contrary, as Garland (2010) points out, 
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the death penalty can be quite useful for the justice system, and it is no coincidence that 
actors within the system are often some of its biggest advocates. Police officers, for 
instance, often see the death penalty as a form of safety in that it may be the only 
incentive that an offender has to refrain from murder. Prosecutors also make practical 
use of the death penalty, employing the mere threat of it “to crack cases, as a platform 
for gaining media attention, and as an issue for mobilizing political support” (Garland, 
2010, p. 289). Capital punishment is a vital tool in the modern justice system because of 
its role as a valuable plea bargaining chip. And, considering that 95 percent of cases 
result in a plea bargain (Bohm, 2007), it is obvious that there is ample opportunity for a 
prosecutor to use capital punishment to their advantage.  
Modern capital punishment is a complex social institution, and like most social 
institutions in the modern Western world, it is cloaked in various forms of rationality 
and civility. The rationalization of the death penalty has helped it to persist, as it has hid 
many of the flaws and inadequacies that exist under the surface (Steiker & Steiker, 
2014). The death penalty has become more centralized, more bureaucratized, and in 
this way is a reflection of society in general. As capital punishment has changed, the 
purposes it serves have changed as well, something we should expect. Whereas once 
capital punishment served a crime control function, before that its main intended 
purpose was state building (Garland, 2010). Thus, capital punishment has changed 
before as the society around it has changed. However, while it has adapted to be 
functionally positive in modern American society, it is important to remember that real 
 46 
 
issues persist within capital punishment, and that its increase in rationality has served 
largely to hide these issues or make them appear resolved.  
Modern Legal Transitions 
 The capital punishment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in the modern era is 
characterized by a desire for increased centralized regulation, alongside a desire to pay 
homage to a traditional posture of deference to localized actors. This is what one would 
expect for two reasons. First, though, the Court often took a hands-off approach to 
capital punishment before the modern era, they did impose their will on a few 
important cases, such as that of the Scottsboro Boys. This willingness on the part of the 
Court to regulate happened largely in the early to mid-twentieth century. Therefore, 
knowing that the Court was willing to regulate in the years leading up to Furman, we 
can view their desires for centralization and rationalization of the death penalty as a 
continuation of something that had already begun to take root. Second, the decision in 
Furman set the stage for what was to come after, and since it dictated that unguided 
juror discretion was unconstitutional, heightened procedural regulation was the only 
path that could be taken were capital punishment to continue on. Thus, by striking 
down capital punishment via Furman, the Court had actually set the stage for the 
assertion of its own will upon the institution.  
 The modern era of capital punishment began in 1976 when the Court heard the 
cases of Gregg v. Georgia and Woodson v. North Carolina, both of which rose out of the 
popular and legislative backlashes that sprung up after Furman (Garland, 2010). 
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Whereas in the years leading up to abolition, around half of the populace was against 
capital punishment, polls in 1976 showed that Americans favored the death penalty “by 
a 2-1 margin” (Bohm, 2012, p. 55). In addition to the grassroots movement that had 
taken hold after 1972, 35 states had drawn up new capital statutes along the lines of 
either guided discretion or mandatory death sentences for certain crimes (Garland, 
2010). Also, as Bohm (2012) notes, a number of members of Congress had been working 
to institute an amendment to the Constitution to bring capital punishment back, and in 
1976 “it appeared that they had the votes to succeed” (p. 55). The Furman backlash is 
important to understand because it provides a context in which the Court’s decisions in 
1976 were to be rendered. While the political realities in 1976 were different than those 
of the pre-modern era when the Court had to worry that an unpopular decision might 
result in insurrectional lynching, it is important to keep in mind that the justices were in 
no way immune from outside political and popular pressure. The environment that the 
Court delivered the Gregg opinion in was much different than when Furman had been 
decided. Furman came at a time when the Civil Rights movement still had momentum, 
and the conservative backlash had yet to coalesce. As Bohm (2012) notes, had the 
backlash not been so widespread, and the atmosphere surrounding the death penalty 
(and other hotbed issues like abortion) not been so charged, it is possible that the Court 
would have struck down the new death penalty statutes in 1976.  
 The Court heard five cases in total concerning the new state capital statutes: 
Jurek v. Texas, Gregg v. Georgia, Profitt v. Florida, Roberts v. Louisiana, and Woodson v. 
North Carolina (Garland, 2010). The latter two concerned mandatory death penalty 
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statutes that some states had drawn up in response to Furman. Here, the justices 
rejected mandatory capital laws because “defendants are different” (Bohm, 2012), and 
the Court did not wish to set a standard that would treat every capital offender the 
same. What the Woodson decision demonstrates is that the Court was trying, as it had 
done in the premodern era, to create a balance. Whereas before the balance had been 
between the opposing forces of reformism and revanchism, now it shifted to creating an 
equilibrium between individualization and consistency (Steiker & Steiker, 2014). 
Mandatory death sentences provide consistency, but do not allow for individual 
consideration, which did not satisfy a Court that wished for different cases to be treated 
as such. This established the stage for the proliferation of the concept of capital 
mitigation.  
We can also view this as the Court trying to avoid both underinclusion and 
overinclusion, two sub-themes Steiker and Steiker (2014) mention that fall under the 
larger theme of “fairness” (p. 80), and that are connected to individualization and 
consistency. The problem of underinclusion had been present in the run up to Furman, 
when the death penalty had started to fall out of favor with the public, and with 
Western society as a whole (Garland, 2010). During this time, capital sentences had 
become increasingly rare, something that the Court had taken into consideration in 
Furman when deciding that the death penalty was arbitrary. As fewer sentences are 
handed down, arbitrary outcomes become ever more likely, especially when jurors have 
total discretion in their decision making. The concern that arises with underinclusion is 
why capital punishment is doled out in only certain cases when there are still a large 
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number of crimes for which it may be or is appropriate. Even more, the people who 
were being targeted for the death penalty before Furman were indigent, and the 
number of black people given capital convictions was highly disproportionate, especially 
for rape (Garland, 2010). So, while in the grand sense the death penalty was arbitrary in 
that it was applied infrequently, when it was applied it was done so consistently to the 
same types of people.  
Overinclusion was not so much an issue that the Court actively sought to curb, 
but rather one they sought to avoid for posterity. There were also other problems with 
mandatory sentencing besides overinclusion and a lack of individual consideration that 
the Court wanted to avoid. As Garland (2010) mentions, the Court wanted to “civilize” 
(p. 258) the death penalty to make sure that it fit with contemporary norms and values; 
the death penalty had to satisfy “evolving standards of decency”. Part of civilizing the 
death penalty was ensuring that it in no way resembled lynching. According to Garland 
(2010), “the specter (of) lynchings has long haunted the American legal system” (p. 33). 
Any resemblance to lynching is not only an affront to modern norms and values, but 
also serves of a recollection of a time when the US government did not have a 
monopoly on violence (a time difficult to imagine in the modern age of militarized 
police). Lynchings were not only horrid displays of violence; they were a threat to the 
legitimacy of the state, whose purpose above all else is the welfare of its citizens. Thus, 
we can see why the Court would want the modern form of capital punishment to be the 
exact opposite of lynching. The linkage between mandatory sentencing and lynching 
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was likely on the Court’s mind when it was considering Woodson, as there are a few 
obvious links between the two.  
First, both are forms of what we might refer to as “no nonsense” justice. In other 
words, “they don’t mess around”. Lynchings in America, depending on the type being 
perpetrated, did involve different forms of ceremony or spectacle. However, the person 
being lynched seldom had a chance for reprieve, and those involved had their minds set 
on a fixed outcome. With mandatory sentencing, there is also ceremony and spectacle 
(the trial), but once the sentence has been handed down, the fixed outcome is put into 
place. All parties involved can be sure of what is to happen. Second, there is no 
individual consideration given to the person who is to be put to death. Lynch mobs were 
not plagued by any humanistic desires to individualize justice. In some ways, the person 
being lynched did not matter at all. While black people were lynched disproportionately, 
they were not the only minority group to be victims of the practice. This does not mean 
that race did not matter, as it clearly did. However, what could matter just as much or 
more in some cases was what the person was thought to have done. The same is true 
largely of mandatory sentencing; the offense dictates the punishment, not the 
offender’s characteristics. With no individual consideration, the defendant becomes 
faceless, and factors that might allow them to escape the death penalty become lost in 
the mix.  
Another issue with mandatory death sentencing is that it has the potential to 
sow the seeds for its own demise in the form of jury nullification. In the days of 
mandatory capital sentencing (mid-nineteenth century and prior), jurors would “acquit 
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(defendants) of capital crimes even in the face of compelling evidence of guilt” (Steiker 
& Steiker, 2016). The Court was in the process of making capital punishment formally 
rational, and mandatory capital sentencing, though in theory providing greater 
consistency, threatened to throw an irrational wrench into the mix. This would not be 
an issue if capital trials did not involve a jury. However, in a trial by jury, individual jurors 
bring their own substantive values (substantive rationality) with them to the courtroom. 
Substantive rationality is in constant tension with formal rationality, and can serve to 
undermine a formally rational system (Feldman, 1991). Such could well have been the 
case if mandatory capital sentencing had been allowed in the modern era.  
 As mentioned earlier, the Court sought balance in its new capital punishment 
scheme, and they found the desired equilibrium in Gregg v. Georgia. In Gregg, the Court 
decided that guided juror discretion, in the form of aggravated criteria and jury 
instructions, addressed the arbitrariness issue which had caused capital punishment to 
be struck down in Furman. Theoretically, underinclusion would not be an issue because 
structured discretion would ensure a standard by which like cases would be treated the 
same. On the other hand, overinclusion would be curbed because the individual 
consideration still present would allow jurors the ability to “distinguish the deserving 
from the undeserving” (Steiker & Steiker, 2014, p. 81). The companion case Jurek v. 
Texas took individual consideration even further (or gave the appearance of doing so). 
The Texas capital statute, written as part of the wide legislative backlash after Furman, 
included a special issue requiring the jury to confirm that the defendant posed a 
“continuing threat to society” before they could be sentenced to death. In the other 
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companion case of Proffitt v. Florida, the Court upheld the right of the trial judge to 
make the final decision regarding the death penalty (Bohm, 2012), thus making the 
jury’s “verdict” a de facto recommendation (this would in theory make Florida’s death 
penalty system more predictable, as trial judges are likely to be more consistent than a 
jury). 
 The Court continued its quest to institute the desired adequate individual 
consideration into the death penalty in Lockett v. Ohio (1978). This ruling held that 
capital trials had to provide for consideration of any mitigating factors the defense 
introduced which might warrant a sentence less than death (Bohm, 2012). Up until 
Lockett was decided, Ohio only allowed for the consideration of mitigators that were 
statutorily listed (Bohm, 2012). The “open-ended” mitigation that has been the result of 
Lockett seems in theory a good way to individualize capital punishment. During the 
course of a trial (usually in the sentencing phase), a defendant, rather their attorney, 
may present literally any evidence that they feel demonstrates that the death penalty 
should not be handed down. Open-ended mitigation, along with other methods of 
individualization, are forms of rationalization, a process which can itself confer 
legitimacy upon a process or institution (Steiker & Steiker, 2014). This has been the case 
with open-ended mitigation, which has given the appearance that the Court has gone to 
great lengths to ensure that the defendant receives fair consideration in the face of the 
ultimate penalty. It is not only Lockett and Gregg that have had this legitimating effect; 
as we will delve into more later in this chapter, there are other cases that have given 
capital punishment a rationalized appearance and helped to ensure its continuation.  
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 Based on appearances then, it may seem that mitigation, as it exists in the 
capital process, is thoroughly appropriate and just. However, this is the effect of 
rationalized legitimation; to cover up issues that exist under the surface. As Haney 
(2014) points out, one issue with open-ended mitigation is that jurors are often unclear 
or confused about what mitigation is, even when given instructions on the subject. Thus, 
in a trial in which mitigation is presented that is not statutorily listed, it is entirely 
possible for jurors to be confused about whether or not what is presented is actually 
mitigating. Haney (2014) has also found that aggravating circumstances are presented in 
clearer language that are mitigating circumstances. Couple this with the fact that 
mitigators are by their nature often unclear, and do not fit in with popular notions of 
crime and criminality (offenders are “different”, “evil”), and the issue becomes clear. 
However, because of the appearance of rigid regulation on the part of the Court, these 
issues rarely manifest above the surface, and are only known to those who study capital 
punishment in depth.  
 The guise of rationality and its legitimating effects can also be seen in Batson v. 
Kentucky, which dealt with the striking of jurors during the jury selection process. In this 
non-capital case, the Court ruled 7-2 that prospective jurors may not be struck based on 
their race (Bohm, 2012). Applied to capital punishment, Batson was also clearly an 
attempt to separate capital punishment from the legacy of lynching, which I have 
discussed previously; all-white juries were a staple of the lynching era. And while the 
decision to prevent striking jurors based on race looks good, the devil is in the details. It 
is difficult to prove that a juror was struck because of race. In reality, all a lawyer 
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accused of such would need to do would be to say that they did not strike the juror 
based on race, and unless there is hard proof (such as in writing or video form), there is 
no way to make such an accusation stick. Also, a lawyer may strike a juror for any stated 
reason (such as long hair) while their real reason for doing so may well have been race. 
Effectively, Batson legitimized the jury selection process by covering up such issues and 
making the process appear to be fair and rational. 
 The Court took on concerns of racial discrimination in the administration of the 
death penalty in 1987 when it heard McCleskey v. Kemp. Race discrimination has long 
plagued the American death penalty and was the reason that the NAACP’s Legal 
Defense Fund first took on the death penalty in the 1960’s (Garland, 2010). In 
McCleskey, the defense presented evidence from the so-called “Baldus study” that 
unequivocally showed Georgia’s capital system to be racially biased by race of victim 
(Steiker & Steiker, 2016). In spite of the overwhelming evidence, the Court ruled against 
Warren McCleskey. What is odd about this case is that the Court did not reject the 
scientific evidence of the Baldus study; on the contrary, the Court accepted the evidence 
presented as valid. However, the Court knew that if they ruled in favor of McCleskey, 
the capital statutes (and likely the criminal justice systems) of every state would be 
called into question, opening up an issue that would be impossible to resolve. Hence, 
the Court ruled on narrow grounds that it was the burden of the defense to prove that 
racial bias affected their particular case.  
 The lesson of McCleskey for outside observers is that formal rationality is not 
always sensible, and that it can act as a defense mechanism for a flawed system. By 
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ruling on narrow, technical grounds in McCleskey, the Court created an impossible 
standard for defendants trying to assert racial bias in their case, and made it useless for 
a defendant to assert that the entire system is plagued by racial bias. Aggregate data, 
regardless of its validity, was rendered worthless. By using formally rational rules to 
narrow the parameters within which racial bias can be asserted by the defense, the 
Court effectively built a shell around capital punishment, insulating it from challenge or 
reform except in isolated instances and fragmentary form. Thus, formal rationalization 
was still a big part of McCleskey, but it was used in a manner different than the previous 
cases I have highlighted; while in those cases the Court’s rationalization served to give 
the death penalty a good appearance by hiding issues under the surface, in McCleskey 
the admittance of racial bias in no way made capital punishment look good. Instead, 
rationalization was used to make the procedure of challenging the death penalty on 
racial grounds effectively nigh undoable.  
 From the previous cases, we can discern a pattern of rationalization on the part 
of the Court. And while this pattern and smaller patterns within the individualization-
standardization dialectic do exist, it is important to keep in mind that the Court is not a 
homogenous body, as it is comprised of nine members of varying political and legal 
views. Also, the Court has changed in composition numerous times during the modern 
era. Because of this, there are bound to be cases that do not fit in with the 
rationalization trend. An example of this is Payne v. Tennessee (1990), in which the 
Court permitted the use of victim-impact statements in the courtroom. This case sticks 
out among the Court’s capital jurisprudence because victim-impact statements are not 
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formally rational, are not professional, and, although they are subject to parameters, 
are not standardized. What also makes Payne peculiar is that the Court had previously 
struck down the use of victim-impact statements a few years earlier in Booth v. 
Maryland, a case much more consistent with the Court’s trend toward formal 
rationalization.  
When we think about victim-impact statements within the bounds of Weber’s 
concepts of rationalization, it becomes clear why permitting them into the capital 
process could be problematic for the Court. Victim-impact statements are substantively 
irrational in that they satisfy “(individual) values and needs” (Feldman, 1991, p. 213), 
and are in large part tied to cultural values and notions of morality. As Weber wrote, 
formal and substantive rationality are in constant tension, and have the potential to 
undermine one another (Feldman, 1991). Thus, we can see that substantively rational 
victim-impact statements are quite distinct from formally rational aspects of the capital 
trial that the Court approved of, such as standardized jury instructions. We can then 
assert that victim-impact statements are formally irrational because they are not 
predictable. This leads to the conclusion that victim-impact statements are or could be 
arbitrary, and are thus easy targets for legal challenge. In other words, victim-impact 
statements have the potential to subvert other areas of the Court’s formally rational 
jurisprudence in regards to capital law. In essence, the Court here opened its flank to 
attack for the purpose of pandering to substantive values and goals. 
Two cases concerning lethal injection are also of note when discussing the Court 
potentially creating problems for itself in the future: in Baze v. Rees (2007) and Glossip 
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v. Gross (2014), the Court upheld the use of certain drugs (a three-drug cocktail in Baze, 
midazolam in Glossip) for lethal injection. Lethal injection is, at least in theory, highly 
rational. It is based on forms of accepted scientific knowledge, and is administered 
according to specific rules and procedures that cause it to appear similar to a medical 
procedure. However, certain drugs that have been used as part of lethal injection, such 
as the aforementioned midazolam, have resulted in irrational outcomes, such as when it 
took forty-three painful minutes for Clayton Lockhart to be executed. The Court’s 
willingness to essentially “kick the can on down the road” means that it is likely that 
similar issues will occur in the future, and that lawyers will have a clear avenue on which 
to challenge lethal injection, or the death penalty as a whole. 
In the modern era, as with the pre-modern era, there exists a pattern in the 
Court’s jurisprudence; however, the pattern in the modern era is much easier discerned. 
The Court clearly set out to rationalize the death penalty in the modern era in large part 
because it was the only path they could take in the aftermath of Furman if capital 
punishment were to persist. It is in this vein that cases such as Lockett and Batson were 
decided. And the Court’s efforts have had the intended purpose of legitimating the 
death penalty by making it appear rational and by distancing it symbolically from the 
history of lynching. However, the “irrationality of rationality” (Ritzer, 2013, p. 15) is 
blatantly apparent in the death penalty, as though formal rationalization has been 
imposed upon it, capital punishment is not predictable, not calculable, and nowhere 
near efficient. Indeed, the case can be made that the death penalty is now more 
arbitrary than ever (Steiker & Steiker, 2014). The addition of cases like Payne that were 
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in no way driven by formally rational legal thought does not aide in making the death 
penalty more sensible. What we can conclude is that which has already been concluded 
by the likes of Steiker and Steiker (2016); the Court’s efforts to impose rationalization on 
the death penalty in the modern era have failed, and the institution is in practice 
arbitrary, capricious, and rogue.  
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Chapter 4 
Application of McDonaldization to Modern Capital Punishment 
 
 Garland (1990) says that “cultural mentalities and sensibilities influence penal 
institutions” (p. 193). This is inclusive of capital punishment as well, and it is in this way 
that I seek to understand modern capital punishment; as an artifact of neoliberalism. 
This chapter will examine modern (post-Gregg) capital punishment jurisprudence and 
administration in regards to neoliberalism. To examine the application of neoliberal 
theory to capital punishment in the modern era, I will use Ritzer’s (2013) four tenets of 
McDonaldization, as a framework. While Ritzer (2013) does not discuss neoliberalism in 
his work on McDonaldization, there is a clear link between them. For example, both rely 
on formally rational rules or laws. Neoliberalism, as discussed in chapter 2, relies on 
complex and often rigid laws to protect private property, accumulation, and 
consumption (Harvey, 2005). McDonaldized institutions implement rules for operation 
that are also complex and rigid so as to promote efficiency (Ritzer, 2013). Also, 
McDonaldization itself is market rationality, which neoliberalism seeks to insert into as 
many societal spheres as possible. Further intersectionality between neoliberalism and 
McDonaldization will be demonstrated in this chapter as well. Each of the four tenets of 
McDonaldization (predictability, calculability, efficiency, control) will be explained 
briefly, then discussed in regards to relevance to modern capital punishment. It should 
be noted that certain aspects of modern capital punishment do not fit exclusively into a 
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given category of McDonaldization, and may appear across categories in the following 
discussion. For instance, capital juror instructions seek to make capital punishment 
more predictable, more efficient, and they are a form of control placed upon jurors. This 
is to be expected given that there is much interplay between the categories, and none 
of them are in any way exhaustive on their own. For example, to make a process more 
efficient and predictable, it is important to exercise adequate control over actors.  
Predictability 
 Ritzer (2013) defines predictability as “the assurance that products and services 
will be the same over time and in all locales” (p. 14). In other words, predictability 
concerns itself greatly with uniformity. This is obvious in the fast food industry that 
Ritzer (2013) writes most about, where the exact same food can be bought on opposite 
ends of the globe. As Ritzer (2013) points out, predictability is desirable for people who 
frequent fast food restaurants. Neoliberalism also values predictability, an example of 
this being its penchant for legislation to protect business interests and private property; 
by setting clear standards, legal decisions concerning private property can be made to 
be more predictable. Also, as discussed in Chapter 2, the bio-political aspect of 
neoliberalism which Dean (2010) discusses seeks to make “freedom” predictable.  
Prediction 
 As was discussed in chapter 3, there have been numerous attempts to make 
capital punishment more rational and predictable in the past via the seeking of new 
methods of execution (Banner, 2003). The need for predictability in execution methods 
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became even more important when the Supreme Court began to insert itself evermore 
into capital punishment affairs. The reason for this was because the Court ruled that 
capital punishment could not be arbitrary; ipso facto, in order to persist it needed to be 
more predictable. In the modern era, the execution method that has come to the 
forefront is lethal injection. Out of the 1,452 executions that have been carried out since 
capital punishment was reinstated by Gregg v Georgia, 1,277 have been by lethal 
injection (“Execution Methods: Authorized Methods”, 2017).  
When we think in terms of predictability and uniformity, it is clear why lethal 
injection is the preferred method of execution. Lethal injection is designed to be 
predictable and uniform, something that is apparent from the fact that it is modelled 
after a medicalized procedure (Garland, 2010).  Any medical procedure is supposed to 
be uniform so as to ensure the best results, and the same can be said of lethal injection.  
The tools used during the process are medical, and the execution drugs are inserted into 
the body intravenously, much as is done in a hospital. While medical professionals rarely 
involve themselves in executions due to ethical concerns, those whose job it is to carry 
out the procedure dress and behave the part. In fact, someone watching an execution 
via lethal injection without any foreknowledge of what was taking place would not be 
remiss to believe they were witnessing a medical procedure.  
The execution process is also similar to a medical procedure in that it is 
technical. As Garland (2010) says “every stage of the procedure is precisely specified in 
advance and then logged and recorded as the process unfolds” (p. 53). Essentially, the 
execution process is laid out into a protocol so as to allow those overseeing and those 
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partaking to know with a reasonable degree of certainty what to expect. There is of 
course variation across states in execution procedure; however the purpose of the 
processes involved, and the rules that govern them, remain the same.  
Rationalized jury instructions, mandated by Gregg v. Georgia, are also designed 
to make capital punishment more predictable. The Supreme Court struck down the 
death penalty as practiced in Furman v. Georgia, with their main reasoning being that its 
arbitrary implementation made it unconstitutional (Banner, 2003). In other words, the 
Court was saying that the death penalty at that point was largely unpredictable. When 
Gregg was decided four years later, the Court saw guided juror discretion in the form of 
instructions as a sufficient way to make capital punishment more predictable. It was also 
important that capital punishment be more predictable so that it would be more 
equitable. Even though the lawyers in Furman and Gregg were not making their 
argument on the grounds of racial discrimination, the Court knew that capital 
punishment disproportionately targeted black people. Thus, by inserting rules and 
structure into the process, the Court thought the death penalty’s racism issue could be 
fixed. As Feldman (1991) states, in theory “abstract and depersonalized formal rules… 
(ensure) equal judgement under the rule of law” (p. 228), which is something the Court 
appears to have believed in.  
Also, rationalized juror instructions fall in line with neoliberal theory. Included in 
the last chapter was a brief overview of Dean’s (2003) discussion concerning the bio-
political bend in neoliberalism. Garland (1997) also discusses this, saying “The neo-
liberal strategy is to require all the actors in an organization to become responsible 
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decision-makers” (p. 197). Essentially, neoliberalism seeks to make its subjects behave 
in a “responsibilized” (Garland, 1997, p. 192) manner. Though it is more overt than at 
the societal level that Dean (2003) and Garland (1997) discuss, we can notice this 
delegation of responsibility with rationalized juror instructions. In the years before the 
Furman decision, two problems that had plagued capital punishment in America were 
jury nullification and the conviction of (mostly black) defendants who were clearly not 
guilty (Garland, 2010). The Court could have tried to remedy these issues with 
mandatory sentencing. However they rejected it in Woodson v. North Carolina (Bohm, 
2012). As Steiker and Steiker (2014) point out, since the Court wished to include 
individual consideration in the capital punishment process, they had to leave certain 
decisions up to the jury. Being that too much choice is unpredictable, the juror 
instructions which the Court approved would then be designed to structure choice so as 
to encourage jurors to carry out their duty responsibly. Thus by “responsibilizing” 
(Garland, 1997, p. 197) jurors and structuring the limits within which choice occurs, the 
Court sought to make capital punishment sentencing more predictable.  
Calculability 
 Calculability refers to “the quantitative aspects of products…and services” 
(Ritzer, 2013, p. 14). Ritzer (2013) observes that, under McDonaldization, “quantity 
tends to become a surrogate for quality” (p. 72). In his discussion on calculability, Ritzer 
(2013) demonstrates that fast food is not the only sphere of society where numerical 
logic is pervasive. For example, higher education has increasingly become all about the 
numbers, as a given student’s worth is often summed up by their grade point average, 
 64 
 
and funding is directed based on metrics (Ritzer, 2013). One aspect of calculability and 
quantitative logic is actuarialism, to which the field of healthcare is greatly subject 
(Ritzer, 2013). Actuarialism, or risk-management, can be expected to increase in a 
neoliberal society. Privatization is encouraged by neoliberalism, and private companies 
are profit-driven, i.e. they are concerned mainly with the bottom line. As we will see, 
quantitative logic is present in modern capital punishment as well.  
The Numbers Game 
 The insertion of quantitative logic into the capital punishment system is quite 
apparent in the case of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In order to hand 
down a death sentence, jurors must find that one of a list of statutory aggravating 
circumstances (factors that might warrant a death sentence) is present in their 
particular case (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). While aggravating factors can differ according 
to state, each state has a list of them, and many are present in multiple state statutes. 
Jurors must consider mitigating circumstances as well, which are factors which warrant 
that a death sentence not be given (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). Aggravating circumstances 
which the jury is allowed to consider are all listed. However, while some states do have 
listed statutory mitigating circumstances, jurors must in addition be allowed “to 
consider any evidence that could reasonably support a sentence less than death” 
(Steiker & Steiker, 2016, p. 166). Thus, any evidence which the defense chooses to 
present as mitigation can be considered as such.  
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The job of the jurors then becomes to consider which factors are more 
important in their case. The process becomes an exercise in “weighing” circumstances 
against one another. Many of the factors, such as whether or not the murder was 
committed in an “especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner” (Walton v. Arizona, 
1990) rely on subjective language. Therefore, the assumption that underlies this 
“weighing” process is that objective, quantitative logic can be applied to the qualitative 
realm. It would also seem implicit here that quantitative logic supersedes the 
qualitative. Theoretically, jurors could then calculate whether or not a death sentence 
should be given. For example, if two aggravating circumstances and only one mitigating 
circumstance are found, then it would seem that a death sentence must be given. It 
then becomes a numbers game to determine whether or not a defendant “deserves” to 
be put to death. This type of logic seeks to make qualitative factors standardized, so that 
it would seem a priori that there is a point (perhaps on a numbered scale) at which a 
murder becomes heinous or cruel.  
As mentioned previously, part of calculability involves risk-management, which 
can be noticed in the focus of capital punishment administration on future 
dangerousness. The concept of future dangerousness was formulated by Texas 
lawmakers when states were restructuring their capital statutes after Furman 
(Cunningham & Sorensen, 2014). Under Texas law, future dangerousness is a special 
issue that must be confirmed in order for a death sentence to be given (Cunningham & 
Sorensen, 2014). The statute states that jurors must confirm “Whether there is a 
probability the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute 
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a continuing threat to society” (Cunningham & Sorensen, 2014, p. 289). The special issue 
was upheld by the Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas, a companion case to Gregg, and has 
also been adopted by Oregon (Cunningham & Sorensen, 2014). In addition, four other 
states have future dangerousness on their statutory list of aggravating factors 
(Cunningham & Sorensen, 2014). In addition to it being ensconced in law, future 
dangerousness is also something that jurors frequently consider on their own 
(Cunningham & Sorensen, 2014); trying to predict future dangerousness is “common 
sense” (though this does not mean it is good sense, as we will see later).  
In determining future dangerousness, jurors are essentially given the same type 
of risk-assessment job one might expect to find at an insurance agency. In fact, 
Cunningham and Sorensen (2014) mention that the risk-assessment models most often 
used to predict the likelihood of future dangerousness (which jurors are shown before 
making their decision) “is extensively employed in the insurance industry” (p. 295). The 
logic at work here is that the use of a prediction-based market tool can help to 
determine in which cases capital punishment is appropriate.  
Efficiency 
 Ritzer (2013) conceives of efficiency as “the optimum method for getting from 
one point to another” (p. 13). Striving for efficiency is a staple of the fast food industry 
(think of the drive-thru window), as well as many other consumer-oriented businesses 
(Ritzer, 2013). As Ritzer (2013) points out, the efficiency offered by the fast food 
industry has caused many other sectors to adapt their business models to be more 
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efficient themselves, as consumers now demand products and services at a faster rate. 
Efficiency is a crux of business in a capitalist society, as faster and cheaper production 
means a higher profit margin. The increasing importance of efficiency means that it has 
become pervasive in many societal spheres, including criminal justice (Bohm, 2007). This 
is also true of capital punishment, which the following discussion will demonstrate.  
An Expedient System 
 Most of the efforts discussed in this chapter that have McDonaldized the death 
penalty have been, in some way, the result of Supreme Court jurisprudence. However, 
one of the most ambitious efforts to make the death penalty more efficient involved 
legislation passed by Congress. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(henceforth referred to as AEDPA), passed into law in 1996, sought to speed up the 
capital punishment process by cutting down on the length of the appeals process 
(Steiker & Steiker, 2016). As Blume (2006) notes, before the passage of AEDPA, there 
was no timetable for inmates filing for habeas relief. AEDPA (which was passed during a 
resurgence of “tough on crime” politics) addressed this non-regulated area by creating a 
one year window for petitioners to file a habeas claim (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). Also 
noted by Steiker and Steiker (2016) is that AEDPA established new barriers to multiple 
(habeas) filings” (p. 139). In addition to petitioners, AEDPA targeted federal courts as 
well by raising the standard for the granting of review (Blume, 2006). According to 
Steiker and Steiker (2016), under AEDPA, “federal courts cannot ordinarily reverse state 
court decisions unless they are not simply wrong, but “unreasonably” wrong” (p. 139). 
What this last quotation demonstrates is not only did legislators (along with President 
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Clinton, who signed AEDPA into law) wish to make the death penalty more expedient, 
but also that they were willing to tolerate a certain amount of error in the system in 
order to do so. In other words, quality was sacrificed for speed and cutting down on 
expense, as some error was assumed to be a natural byproduct.  
 The Court has also made efforts to cut down on the appeals process, evidenced 
in McCleskey v. Zant. Warren McCleskey (also the subject of McCleskey v. Kemp, which 
will be discussed later) was convicted of murder in part based on evidence provided by 
Offie Evans, a jailhouse snitch whom the state sought to use to gain evidence on the 
former (McCleskey v. Zant, 1991). After he was sentenced to death, McCleskey filed a 
federal habeas petition. In his first petition, McCleskey “did not raise a Massiah claim” 
(McCleskey v. Zant, 1991). A Massiah claim challenges testimony given by a defendant 
when counsel is not present (McCleskey v. Zant, 1991). After the first petition failed, 
McCleskey filed a second which included a Massiah claim. The Court declined to grant 
relief to McCleskey, not on the ground that his claim lacked merit, but because he failed 
to file the Massiah claim in the first petition (McCleskey v. Zant, 1991). In effect, the 
Court chose to rule on technical, procedural grounds instead of considering the 
substantive issues present in McCleskey’s case. This also shows that, like the legislators 
who passed AEDPA, the Court privileged an efficient, technicalized, process-oriented 
system over the substantive legal rights of petitioners.  
 The preferred method of execution in the modern era, lethal injection, also 
attempts to make capital punishment more efficient. Executions of the pre-modern era, 
particularly in the time before privatization, often involved some sort of pomp and 
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circumstance; an execution was a community event. However, as Garland (2010) 
discusses, modern executions are more about “nonperformance” (p. 52); i.e. they are 
about routinization of the process. Modern executions have cut loose two aspects of 
past executions that serve as a threat to efficiency; the crowd and the brutality. In place 
of the crowd now is a tightly controlled, selected group of witnesses who have virtually 
no effect on the proceedings (Garland, 2010). Also, instead of the brutality, blood, and 
spectacle that was once present, now the condemned lies still on a gurney, and is 
administered fluids through an IV. The whole process is made to appear professional, 
speedy, and routinized, with all the trappings of efficiency.  
 Lastly for this section, the narrowing of the class of death-eligible crimes and 
defendants has been an attempt at making the death penalty more efficient. As was 
discussed in Chapter 3, in the pre-modern era of capital punishment, there were a 
relatively wide range of crimes that could be punished capitally (Banner, 2003). One of 
these crimes, rape, became part of the death penalty’s crisis of legitimacy in the lead-up 
to Furman; as the vast majority of people sentenced to death for rape were black (often 
with white victims), this offense was a clear site of racial discrimination and a threat to 
capital punishment’s legitimacy (Garland, 2010). It seems clear that the Court 
recognized the threat that the inclusion of rape posed to capital punishment, as they 
struck it down as a capital offense in Coker v. Georgia in 1977, shortly after they 
reinstated the death penalty in the Gregg decision (Garland, 2010). The linkage of 
racially disproportionate execution for rape to the lynching roots of capital punishment 
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undermined the death penalty’s efficiency. Coker rectified this without explicitly 
mentioning race.  
 As Garland (2010) notes, a plethora of cases in the modern era have served to 
narrow the class of the death eligible. These include: the aforementioned Coker v. 
Georgia, which did away with the rape of an adult; Ford v. Wainwright, which excluded 
defendants who are insane at the time of their execution; and Atkins v. Virginia, which 
excluded the intellectually disabled. Having a large number of crimes and offenders that 
can be punished capitally is a potential impediment to the efficiency of capital 
punishment because, to use quantitative terminology, it puts more variables in play. 
This is especially true in the modern era when, despite aforementioned efforts to cut 
down on the number of appeals, the appeals process is still rather lengthy (Steiker & 
Steiker, 2016). Therefore, it has been necessary for the Court to cut down the number 
of potential capital cases in order to try to avoid logjams. In addition, having too many 
crimes punishable by death is a threat to the legitimacy of the death penalty, as modern 
sensibilities are not in line with punishing by death crimes which do not involve death 
(Garland, 2010). So, the narrowing of the class of the death-eligible has at the same time 
sought to legitimate capital punishment, as well as to make it more efficient.   
Control 
 The last tenet of McDonaldization concerns the assertion of control over actors. 
As Ritzer (2013) discusses, in business, numerous forms of control are implemented to 
manage employees. A high amount of control is usually aimed more at lower-level 
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employees, especially in the fast food industry where such employees receive training 
on how to perform a small number of tasks in a standardized manner. It is natural that 
lower-level employees are subject to stricter forms of control because they are at the 
bottom of the hierarchy that delineates responsibility and decides upon the division of 
labor. Control also necessitates the existence of a bureaucracy, as well as clear and 
often rigid rules and regulations (Ritzer, 2013). In the fast food industry, and others in 
which consumers must set fit in an establishment, control is also exercised over non-
employees. For example, the menus at fast food restaurants offer a limited range of 
options to encourage consumers to choose quickly, eat quickly, and leave (Ritzer, 2013).  
Managing the System 
 No examination of control and capital punishment can be said to be complete 
without considering the role of the Supreme Court. As discussed in chapter 3, the Court 
for the most part stayed out of death penalty matters prior to the Furman decision. 
However, since that time, the Court has been at the forefront of capital punishment 
litigation (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). The Court’s assertion of control can be said to have 
begun with the dissent in Furman, when it set the parameters within which capital 
punishment could be constitutional, i.e. guided discretion or mandatory sentencing. 
Four years later, the Court tightened its grip with the Gregg decision when it approved 
the new rules which would govern the capital punishment process. Since then, “the 
Court (has) embarked on a course of continuing constitutional regulation of capital 
punishment” (Steiker & Steiker, 2014, p. 77). The vast majority of regulation which 
capital punishment is now subject to has been imposed by the Court (with a few notable 
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exceptions, such as AEDPA). The Court’s control over capital punishment is much in line 
with neoliberal theory. Harvey (2005) points out that neoliberalism is “profoundly 
suspicious of democracy” (p. 66). He also states that, within neoliberal theory, “a strong 
preference exists for government by executive order and judicial decision rather than 
democratic and parliamentary decision-making” (Harvey, 2005, p. 66).  
Even in nations with democratic principles and institutions, neoliberals would 
prefer key decisions be made by elites, as populism can serve as a reaction formation 
against neoliberalism. This is evidenced by the popular backlash to Furman. This is 
certainly applicable to capital punishment. Though rules and regulations concerning 
capital punishment have been made and implemented by representative elected 
officials, they have (during the modern era) been subservient to the Supreme Court. The 
fact that the Court has taken the role of crucial end-game decision-maker upon itself vis-
à-vis capital punishment is very much in line with neoliberal theory. It should be noted 
though that the Court has not assumed all decision-making, and has granted deference 
to states and local actors; however, as will be discussed later, this can be thought of as 
simply another form of control.  
 We might also view the Supreme Court’s interjection into capital punishment 
affairs as a form of class control. A foundation for this argument is laid out by Soviet 
scholar E.B. Pashukanis, who postulated that “there is an homology between the logic of 
the commodity form and the logic of the legal form” (Beirne & Sharlet, 1980, p. 274). In 
other words Pashukanis is saying that, in capitalist societies, the law legitimates 
capitalist ideology, and vice versa (Garland, 1990). This form of control over the law 
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which Pashukanis postulates is of course not blatant, and is legitimated by the law’s 
“claim to be a neutral guarantor of individual freedoms” (Garland, 1990, p. 113). 
However, Pashukanis also discusses a more direct form of control, which might best 
thought of as an intervention by state actors. Garland (1990) in his discussion of 
Pashukanis’ work, states “there will be occasions when the exigencies of the political 
situation lead the state authorities to dispense with the niceties of legal form and 
pursue their class objectives by more direct means” (p. 113-114). This quotation seems 
almost a complete characterization of the Supreme Court’s decision in McCleskey v. 
Kemp.  
 In McCleskey, the defense put forth empirical evidence that Georgia’s capital 
punishment system was racially biased (Bohm, 2012). The chief piece of evidence 
presented by the defense was the Baldus study, which demonstrated that Georgia’s 
capital system was racially biased based on race of victim (Bohm, 2012). Essentially, a 
black defendant who murdered a white person was significantly more likely to receive a 
death sentence than a white defendant who killed a black person. The case was 
important because it demonstrated racial bias, which had been a concern of the Court 
when it struck down capital punishment as then practiced in Furman (Garland, 2010). 
Despite the study, the Court upheld McCleskey’s death sentence on the reasoning that 
the defense had not presented evidence of racial bias in their particular case (Bohm, 
2012). Garland (2010) characterizes the Court’s decision in McCleskey as “(drawing) 
back” (p. 274) from its regulatory duties. In a way this is correct, as the Court reasoned 
that such decisions regarding racial bias should be left up to the states (Garland, 2010).  
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 I would argue, however, that McCleskey was a site of the Court inserting itself 
and protecting class interests. McCleskey presented clear evidence that racial bias 
plagued Georgia’s system, which, due to all states having to conform to a certain model 
system as decided in Gregg, meant that such bias was likely present in other (or all) 
jurisdictions as well. As Banner (2003) notes, if the Court had decided in favor of 
McCleskey, it would have opened up the potential for inquiries about other forms of 
bias as well (such as gender bias), and likely meant that the entire criminal justice 
apparatus would be targeted for inquiry. The Court even recognized this in its written 
decision (Garland, 2010). Camp (2016) makes the argument that the criminal justice 
system is a form of class control, and that mass incarceration has come about as a 
protection of neoliberal class interests. Taking Camp’s (2016) argument into 
consideration, we can see that a decision in favor of Warren McCleskey would have 
been a massive threat to class interests. Circling back to Pashukanis’ argument, it would 
seem then that McCleskey was an instance of the Court “dispens(ing) with the niceties 
of legal form” (Garland, 1990, p. 113). In short, the Court took the gloves off, and took a 
direct approach to protect class interests, a form of control which separates itself from 
much of the rest of its modern capital jurisprudence.  
 Control is also exercised in a different manner in modern capital punishment by 
what might be called the diffusion of responsibility. As Ritzer (2013) discusses, modern 
fast food jobs are characterized by employees being assigned specific, repetitive tasks 
that are relatively simple, and act as one part in a larger process. This type of 
standardized, compartmentalized labor can also be found in modern capital punishment 
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via lethal injection (Banner, 2003). Steiker and Steiker (2014) state that the modern 
death penalty’s division of labor has “had a legitimating effect on actors within the 
justice system”, and has “create(d) a false aura of rationality, even science, around the 
necessarily moral task of deciding life or death” (p. 92). This is a point that Banner 
(2003) echoes, saying that actors who take place in the execution procedure can think of 
themselves as “a mere link in a long chain” (p. 299).  
 But, the diffusion of responsibility does not only apply to the actors who take 
place in the actual execution (Steiker & Steiker, 2014). In reality, any actor who in any 
way has anything to do with the capital punishment system may be subject a diffusion 
of responsibility. Part of this is due to the elaborate appellate review system which has 
been imposed upon capital punishment (Steiker & Steiker, 2014). So then, as Steiker and 
Steiker (2014) point out, theoretically it is easier for actors in the system to make 
decisions for which they do not have to feel ultimately accountable. For instance, a juror 
can rest easy if they vote for death with some uncertainty because their decision will be 
subject to automatic review. A local prosecutor who pursues the death penalty in a case 
where perhaps it is less appropriate can feel good about the fact that their error in 
judgement will be subject to intense state and federal scrutiny later in the process. All 
the while, higher level actors can point to their respect for local autonomy and 
deference to lower level actors This form of control, because it is not overt and thus not 
easily noticeable, is arguably more effective. By making it so that people do not have to 
actively engage with the role they play in the process (or making it easier for them to 
rationalize their engagement), the death penalty’s division of labor makes moral 
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disengagement more expedient than it might otherwise be. Essentially, regulation and 
bureaucratization serves the purpose of making the entire capital punishment process 
more personally disinterested.  
The Irrationality of Rationality 
 McDonaldization is an attempt to insert formal rationality within systems to 
make them more predictable, calculable, efficient, and controllable. However, as Ritzer 
(2013) points out, “rationalized systems inevitably spawn irrationalities that limit, 
eventually compromise, and perhaps even undermine their rationality” (p. 123). Ritzer 
(2013) asserts that irrationality is “at the most general level…a label for many of the 
negative aspects of McDonaldization…the opposite of rationality” (p. 123). We can also 
think of irrationalities as caused by contradictions that lie underneath the surface of 
different rationally-imposed aspects of capital punishment. Until this point, the 
discussion concerning McDonaldization and capital punishment has not addressed 
irrationality. This is because the point until now has been to, in Marxian terms, 
“abstract” the modern American death penalty so as to illustrate the operation within it 
of neoliberal market rationality, which is what I argue McDonaldization is. For the rest of 
this chapter, we will take a more “realistic” view of the death penalty to view the 
numerous irrationalities that exist in its operation. 
Harmful Effects 
 First to be addressed here will be lethal injection, American capital punishment’s 
preferred modus operandi. I discussed in the first section of this chapter that the 
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adoption of lethal injection has been an attempt to make capital punishment more 
predictable and uniform in its implementation. However, an irrationality that has caused 
lethal injection to become somewhat unpredictable is the shortage of certain drugs 
used to execute the condemned. Steiker and Steiker (2016) mention that, when 
execution drugs were more readily available, “the most common lethal injection 
protocol was a three-drug combination that included a barbiturate sedative, a paralytic 
agent, and a heart-stopping drug” (p. 15). In recent years, such drugs have been harder 
to come by due to manufacturers not wanting to be associated with capital punishment 
(Steiker & Steiker, 2016). This has caused states to seek out and use new drugs, either 
alone or as a combination, which are often not tested. As might be expected, this has 
led to irrationality. In the year 2014 alone, “four separate executions using new drug 
protocols were seriously botched in Ohio, Oklahoma, and Arizona” (Steiker & Steiker, 
2016). The most well-known of the four occurred during the gruesome execution of 
Clayton Lockett. In this case, Oklahoma was using a new three-drug cocktail that 
included midazolam, which has been under much scrutiny since it was adopted in lethal 
injections (Lain, 2015). Locket was described as “writhing and twitching in pain” (Lain, 
2015, p. 831) during the execution. In addition he continually tried to raise himself up 
off of the gurney in agony, until he eventually died of a heart attack (Lain, 2015, p. 831).  
 Though botched lethal injections are a product of the drug shortage, they are 
certainly not exclusive to recent years. Lethal injection has been presented, and is often 
thought of, as a humane method of execution that is painless (hence its comparison to a 
medical procedure). However, botches are very much a part of the history of lethal 
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injection. In his study of executions, Sarat (2016) found lethal injection to have 7 
percent rate of botched executions since its implementation. Compared with other 
methods of execution (firing squad, gas chamber, hanging, and electrocution), lethal 
injection has the highest botch rate, with the gas chamber coming in second at 5.4 
percent (Sarat, 2016). So, the obvious irrationality here is that lethal injection is less 
predictable than more archaic methods of execution that it is often thought to be 
superior to. It should be noted that the percent of botched lethal injections may actually 
be greater than Sarat (2016) estimates. The reason for this is that lethal injections 
include a paralysis-inducing drug which can hide pain. Thus, it is possible that numerous 
inmates have suffered intense pain during an execution but have not been able to 
express it physically.  
 Also addressed in the predictability section were capital juror instructions. The 
purpose of juror instructions is to guide the discretion of jurors in order to make capital 
sentencing less arbitrary, and by implication more predictable. The underlying 
assumption of juror instructions, or guided discretion in general, is that jurors are 
capable of understanding facts relevant to capital punishment, that they will follow the 
instructions, and that they will be able to consistently make the correct decision. 
However, there are a few tensions that lie under the surface of guided discretion that 
work against its purpose and lead to irrationalities.  
 As Haney (2014) notes, “the most significant problems stem from the general 
incomprehensibility of the instructions” (p. 501). In a study conducted by Haney and 
Lynch (1994), it was found that “college-educated students” (p. 420) struggled to 
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comprehend California’s death penalty instructions (this is made more troubling by the 
fact that most jurors are not college-educated). Furthermore, Haney and Lynch (1994) 
found that only 15 percent of their studied population could define the concept of 
aggravation, and only 12 percent could do so concerning mitigation. Only 8 percent of 
their sample could define both terms correctly. Also, Haney (2014) says that “jurors who 
had served in actual capital cases were plagued by fundamental misconceptions about 
what the instructions meant” (p. 502). Aggravation and mitigation are both important 
concepts, as jurors are tasked with weighing them against one another in order to 
determine whether or not a death sentence is appropriate. So, what this research 
demonstrates is that the vast majority of jurors are likely under informed about the 
subjects they are dealing with when they make their decision.  
 We might conclude based on the research mentioned in the previous chapter 
that, since jurors often misunderstand the instructions that are designed to guide them, 
they are likely to be wrong (or at the least misguided) in their decision-making, and that 
capital sentences are doled out in a manner that is arbitrary. There is some research 
that backs up these inferences. First, let us return to the special issue of future 
dangerousness. As mentioned previously, in Texas and Oregon, in capital cases jurors 
must conclude that a defender poses a “continuing threat to society” (Cunningham & 
Sorensen, 2014, p. 289) in order to give them a death sentence (Cunningham & 
Sorensen, 2014). Research conducted concerning the accuracy of these predictions has 
found that jurors who affirmed the special issue were correct only 5.5 percent of the 
time, and that they would have a better chance of predicting future dangerousness by 
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simply guessing (Cunningham & Sorensen, 2014). In addition, the aforementioned “2% 
Death Penalty” report found that only 2 percent of counties in the United States have 
produced over half of the death sentences which have led to executions in the modern 
era. Thus it would appear that the contradictions underlying juror instructions (failure to 
comprehend) have resulted in a death penalty that is unpredictable and arbitrary.  
 As discussed previously in this chapter, there have been many efforts to make 
capital punishment more efficient. Here, we will focus on the narrowing of the class of 
death-eligible defendants and crimes.  I mentioned before that the number of crimes 
that can be punished capitally in the modern era has been significantly narrowed 
compared to the premodern era (Banner, 2003). This has been the case with defendants 
as well, such as the intellectually disabled. Theoretically, the fact that juror discretion 
has been guided in the modern era would suggest a narrowing of kinds of defendants 
sentenced to death, as jurors would be more informed during the decision-making 
process.   
 However, in reality, the narrowing that appears to have taken place is largely a 
façade. Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski (1990) demonstrate this, saying that “virtually 
all persons sentenced to death in Georgia before Furman would have been deemed 
death eligible under Georgia’s post-Furman statute” (p. 102). While Baldus et al. (1990) 
only mention Georgia, given that all death penalty states have the same general 
template for their capital statutes, we can reasonably infer that the same is true in 
numerous other jurisdictions besides Georgia. There are, perhaps, a few reasons for 
this, one of which is certain language within capital statutes. One statutory aggravating 
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factor in many states is the aforementioned “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” 
qualification. As Steiker and Steiker (2014) mention, “factors that focus on whether an 
intentional murder was “especially heinous” or manifested an “utter disregard for 
human life” invite an affirmative answer in every case” (p. 85).  
Many statutes say that any murder is heinous, atrocious, or cruel in some way, 
which then gives jurors the job of determining what constitutes “especially” (Steiker & 
Steiker, 2014). Given that jurors are told that any murder is heinous, atrocious, and 
cruel, making the subjective leap to “especially” seems, as Steiker and Steiker (2014) 
say, likely to “invite an affirmative answer” (p. 85). The same can be said of the future 
dangerousness special issue in Texas and Oregon. Asking jurors if someone who has 
been found to have committed aggravated murder might pose a “continuing threat to 
society” seems almost a method designed for obtaining a positive answer. 
Also, some of the Supreme Court’s efforts at narrowing have left open holes that 
undermine real attempts at cutting down on who can be sentenced to death. A good 
example of this is Atkins v. Virginia. Decided in 2002, Atkins took on the issue of 
executing defendants who are intellectually disabled (not to be confused with mentally 
ill). The court decided that it was in violation of the Eighth Amendment to execute the 
intellectually disabled, but failed to adopt a measure to define intellectual disability 
(Bohm, 2012). This means that it has become the job of states to do so, and as we might 
expect, states have adopted varying standards (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). This means that 
it is entirely possible for people who might be considered intellectually disabled outside 
of a given state’s guideline to be executed. An example of this would be Atkins himself, 
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who was sentenced to death even though he had an IQ of only 59, which is well below 
the usual standard of 70 (Bohm, 2012). The Court’s deferment to local actors in this case 
is odd, as it would seem that jurors are quite unfit to determine intellectual disability, 
especially as it relates to culpability in a murder. We might view this as a form of 
“responsibilitization”, or “rule-at-a-distance” (Garland, 1997, p. 194) logic on the part of 
the Court, which is quite typical of neoliberalism. Whatever the case, deferment by the 
Court has resulted in irrationalities that undermine their original goal.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued in this thesis that modern capital punishment in the United States 
can be understood by situating it within the framework of neoliberal market rationality, 
as illustrated by McDonaldization. My argument stems from the idea that punishment is 
an artifact of culture, which has been put forth by Garland (1990). Neoliberalism and 
McDonaldization are both cultural products with deep structural undertones, and being 
as they are both so prevalent in society, it should be no surprise that they have a great 
effect on punishment, which has been demonstrated by Bohm (2007) and Wacquant 
(2010), though not in regards to capital punishment. Ritzer (2013) has established the 
cultural aspects of McDonaldization by showing that it is a significant part of pop 
culture, and that a significant part of the population of America (and many other 
nations) desire it (the rubber cage). By applying the four tenets of predictability, 
calculability, efficiency, and control to modern era capital punishment, I have illustrated 
the infusion of neoliberal market rationality into this institution. In addition to these 
four tenets, the application of the irrationality of rationality demonstrates many of the 
seemingly irrational issues that surround the American death penalty, and that these 
issues often stem from rationalization itself.  
 The argument I have put forth shows that rationalization/McDonaldization has 
resulted in capital punishment becoming a process-oriented system. The process is 
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reified in two ways: the Supreme Court via direct action (McCleskey v. Kemp), and, more 
often and more importantly, the legitimacy that the appearance of the four tenets of 
McDonaldization provide. Steiker and Steiker (2014) have explored the legitimating 
effects of rationalization on capital punishment in the modern era, however, not 
through the lens of McDonaldization. I would argue that McDonaldization provides a 
better understanding of capital punishment’s legitimation because we can see that it 
has legitimated other spheres of society as well. In short, McDonaldization illuminates 
the connectivity of capital punishment to other areas of neoliberal society.  
 The state that capital punishment is in is the result of rationalization, with the 
lion’s share coming from the Supreme Court (Steiker & Steiker, 2016). The Court has 
taken it upon itself to be at the forefront of capital punishment litigation, and has heard 
many cases and handed down numerous decisions that have created an ever-expanding 
web of regulatory jurisprudence around it. As Steiker and Steiker (2014) discuss, most of 
the decisions that have come from the Court in the modern era have been concerned 
with highly technical matters, and have thereby narrowed the grounds on which 
arguments can be put forth to challenge capital punishment’s legitimacy (such as 
McCleskey v. Kemp). The result has been that capital punishment appears to be highly 
regulated by Court jurisprudence that has been “extraordinarily searching” (Steiker & 
Steiker, 2014, p. 84). However, in reality this is not the case, as capital punishment is 
plagued by many issues, some of which I explored in the last chapter, which are the 
result of rationalization or deference by the Court.  
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 This does not mean, however, that the Court has done nothing that has had any 
effect on capital punishment. As I mentioned, the death penalty has become heavily 
process-oriented and Mcdonaldized, and this is clearly, for the most part, the result of 
Court decisions. When I say process-oriented, I mean that the conduct of actors 
following abstract rules and regulations has become more important than the 
substantive issues that plague the system. Recall the case of McCleskey v. Zant, when 
the Court ruled against a claim raised by McCleskey that brought up important 
fundamental issues in his case because he had failed to put the claim forth during his 
first appeal. Being so process-oriented, rationalization often neglects to address 
substantive underlying issues within systems, and mainly is concerned with surface 
issues. Such is the case with the Supreme Court, which does not see problems as 
endemic to capital punishment, but rather as abnormalities existing in individual cases 
which can be fixed by narrow rationalization. This is much in line with neoliberal logic in 
that it focuses completely on the individual level, echoing Thatcher’s sentiment that 
“there is no such thing is society.” The implication is that any issues that exist can be 
remedied in a kind of non-social vacuum.  
 Two cases in particular demonstrate how important and ingrained the process is 
in regards to capital punishment. The first is Atkins v. Virginia, wherein the Court 
decided that it is unconstitutional to execute the intellectually disabled, yet left it up to 
the states to implement their own rationalized standards for measuring intellectual 
disability (Bohm, 2012). As was discussed earlier, this has resulted in varying standards 
across states, and, hence, irrational outcomes. The second case, Moore v. Texas, arose 
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because of this variation, and sought to impose rationality on the irrationality which was 
the result of Atkins. In Moore, the Court struck down Texas’ guidelines for determining 
intellectual disability, as it was not based on any accepted scientific standard (Wolf, 
2017). Here, we can clearly see that rationalization often results in irrationalities, as was 
discussed in Chapter 4. This is the dialectic of rationalization. It should be noted that this 
tension existed before neoliberalism and was inherent in classical liberalism as well, as 
shown by Horkheimer and Adorno (2002). 
Moreover, we see the belief by the Court that the way to solve problems is more 
rationalization, and narrow rationalization at that. Moore does not implement one 
standard across all states, but rather focuses in narrowly on Texas’ standard. We can 
expect this type of fix in a McDonaldized system, as McDonaldization itself is obviously a 
product of rationalization (Ritzer, 2013). Thus, a system born of rationalization (which 
modern capital punishment is) will inevitably privilege formally rational thought as a 
proper way of fixing irrationalities, the irony being that said irrationalities which pop up 
in McDonaldized systems often result from rationalization. Thus, it is accurate to say 
that Moore was a “fix” for Atkins though only a partial or surface fix, as the Court’s 
desire for rationalization exists along with, but to lesser degree, a tendency to grant 
deference to states. This is also in keeping with neoliberal theory, which seeks to pull 
back from excessive government regulation. Both avenues, centralized rationality and 
deference to localism, are pursued as a means of legitimation of capital punishment as 
an institution and of the Court’s authority generally.  
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If we think of the Court as governing in the case of Atkins, then it would seem 
that it was governing itself in Moore. It is these two cases which demonstrate perfectly 
the current state of capital punishment in America. The Court, through rationalization 
inherently needing to be bolstered by more rationalization, has become thoroughly 
engaged in “the conduct of conduct” (Garland, 1997, p. 194). Put another way, the 
Court’s increasingly technical and “fixing” jurisprudence is an example of “the 
governmentalization of government”, or “reflexive government” (Dean, 2010, p. 205). 
The underlying dialectic of this process is the tension between rationality and 
irrationality, the latter of which often creates the perceived need for more of the 
former.  
 Dean (2010) characterizes “the governmentalization of government (p. 205) as 
follows: “the state…is today meeting, being partially displaced by, reinscribed and 
recoded within another trajectory whereby the mechanisms of government themselves 
are subject to problematization, scrutiny and reformation” (p. 223). This definition 
reveals something about the government of government, in that it is, as Dean (2010) 
says, partial. In one way, reflexive government might appear to us as more of the same. 
I say this because reflexive government entails greater formal rationality (and ipso facto 
irrationality), and a further entrenchment of the sanctity of the process, i.e. form over 
substance. However, once again this is partial, as reflexive government manifests as a 
higher tier of government which seeks to hold government accountable to itself. It is a 
new area, where government is “monitored and prudently managed” (Dean, 2010, p. 
194) by government. To think of it in terms of McDonaldization, instead of simply 
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predictability, we might see an attempt to predict how much predictability can be 
expected, to calculate calculability, to ascertain the efficacy of efficiency, or to exercise 
control over mechanisms of control.  
 A neoliberal analysis of the current state of American capital punishment allows 
one to logically consider what the future will hold for the institution. It is here where the 
concept of reflexive government is most relevant to my analysis. Dean (2010) talks of 
reflexive government as a form of governmentality that is still coming into being, and is 
doing so during the era of neoliberalism. This is evidenced in the previous quotation 
from his work, where he says that the current form of government is “being partially 
displaced” (Dean, 2010, p. 205). The implication of this is that we can expect reflexive 
government to continue on its path forward. Essentially, reflexive government, i.e. 
“government that entails a reduplication of the objectives of government upon itself” 
(Dean, 2010, p. 192), is where neoliberalism is heading.  
 My theorization implies that this is what we can expect for the future of capital 
punishment. If we think of reflexivity as a continuum, capital punishment will become 
more and more reflexive, and will become subject to increasing governmentalization. As 
Dean (2010) notes, “Foucault suggested that liberal and social forms of governance be 
understood as features on the trajectory of the governmentalization of the state” (p. 
223). In other words, classical liberalism brought a certain degree of governmentality to 
the state, neoliberalism has brought more, and reflexive government will then bring 
more as well. Knowing the history of capital punishment in America, we can broadly 
perceive this same trend.  
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For the larger part of the premodern era, the Court stayed out of capital 
punishment affairs. However, as I pointed out in chapter 3, the Court began towards the 
later years of the era to play the part of liberal nobles, and subjected capital punishment 
to humanistic regulatory reforms. Then, in the neoliberal era (which coincides with the 
modern era of capital punishment) the Court has been much more ambitious in its 
efforts to regulate the death penalty, and has bestowed upon it a vast, technical web of 
jurisprudence that has served to thoroughly governmentalize it. And, since 
neoliberalism is giving way to reflexive government, we can expect capital punishment 
to be shaped by this new form of governmentality as it has been by the previous types. 
Governmentalization will need to be governed.  
That capital punishment will be shaped by reflexive government can be 
reasonably hypothesized based on the previously mentioned dialectic; that of the 
inherent tension between rationality and irrationality. It is best to think of rationality, or 
formal rationality, as hegemonic. I mean this in the sense that it has the ability to 
become so ingrained that it morphs into common sense, and other ways of thinking are 
not even considered, or are seen as not measuring up to rationality’s standards. 
Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) point out the hegemonic nature of rationality; “No 
matter what myths are invoked against it, by being used as arguments they are made to 
acknowledge the very principle of corrosive rationality of which enlightenment stands 
accused” (p. 4). This quotation reveals “corrosive rationality” (or formal rationality) as 
an artifact of the Enlightenment. This rationality has persisted and expanded since then 
and dominates the world today (McDonaldization). According to Feldman (1991), Max 
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Weber himself believed that formal rationality would continue to spread throughout the 
world. Thus, from what has been written about it previously, we can expect 
rationalization to continue to seep into new areas, as well as tighten its grip where it 
already exists, such as capital punishment.  
 Also, the dialectic shows that rationality has an ability to reproduce itself. A 
constant of rationalization is its function to produce irrationalities (Ritzer, 2013). This 
can cause somewhat of a crisis of legitimacy for whatever system the irrationality occurs 
in, with a degree of variation based on the perceived severity of harm caused by the 
irrationality. However, as I have mentioned previously, the fix within a rationalized 
system to any irrationality is more rationalization to shore up legitimacy in response to 
“crises.” This new rationality will then afford fresh legitimacy (in the form of renewed 
faith in rationality) to the system, as it promises to correct the issue. We have already 
noticed this in the case of Moore v. Texas, which “fixed” an irrationality that sprang 
from Atkins v. Virginia. In the cases of Atkins and Moore, jurisprudence was stacked on 
top of prior jurisprudence, and it is precisely this which we can expect to continue in the 
future of capital punishment. As Garland (1990) discusses, as long as fundamental issues 
are avoided and the focus is put on technical matters, an institution will continue to 
persist and justify its failures. Moore, as well as other cases such as both McCleskey v. 
Kemp and McCleskey v. Zant, show that rationalization does not address substantive 
problems, but is content to deal with those technical matters. If any irrationality within 
the death penalty is to be addressed with more rationality (as it must be in order for the 
institution to persist as it does now), then it becomes apparent that capital punishment 
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will continue on to become increasingly more reflexive, process-oriented, and 
McDonaldized.  
 Like any study, mine has limitations. One is that this analysis is quite broad, 
which I knew and planned for going in. Where I focus on jurisprudence, I do so almost 
exclusively in terms of the United States Supreme Court. However, there are numerous 
cases at the lower court levels, such as the state supreme courts or appellate courts, 
which have had a great impact on how capital punishment operates. Another limitation 
of this analysis is that I do not address in-depth the history of racism and lynching 
embedded within American capital punishment. While I do mention it in chapter 3, I do 
not develop its significance in relation to neoliberalism. Race has played and continues 
to play a crucial role in American capital punishment, and it is certainly a drawback that I 
have not written more about it in this work. Also, the effects of populism and local 
politics on the death penalty are not explored here, and considering that they both 
operate outside of McDonaldization, and encourage deference granting, it would be 
prudent to address what part they play in regards to capital punishment. Any future 
research which seeks to add to or build upon my analysis would surely want to consider 
these limitations.  
 Future research might also want to examine two areas which would serve to 
build upon my analysis. First, whereas I am examining the effect of certain aspects of 
culture on capital punishment, others could seek to understand the effect that the 
modern form of capital punishment has on culture. Broadly, it is not so insightful to say 
that capital punishment has a cultural effect, as it is quite obvious that culture shapes 
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practice and practice shapes culture (Garland, 1990). However, a specific analysis that 
seeks to demonstrate how capital punishment shapes cultural perceptions of 
criminality, crime control, and punishment in general, would be quite insightful, and 
would meaningfully add to our current understanding of American capital punishment. 
Secondly, more research is warranted concerning how desensitization results from 
McDonaldization or rationalization in general. It would seem a priori that, over time, as 
rationalization inevitably leads to irrationality, people become desensitized to the 
harmful aspects of McDonaldization and rationality. Rationalization is cumulative, and 
as it continues to be employed (often to fix irrationalities), it would seem that people 
come to expect it, and thus the irrationalities that accompany it. An in-depth analysis of 
this effect would add greatly to the current understanding of McDonaldization and 
rationalization, specifically in how they legitimate institutions.  
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